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Belief in a Just World: Empathy with Innocent Victims and ;,< 
Mood Change (126 pp.) 
Directors John R. Means, Ph.D. tJ^/\ 
Just world research has found that high just world observers 
will derogate innocent victims in order to maintain their be- 
lief in a just world. How such individuals react when victim- 
ized themselves, however, has not been investigated. The pre- 
sent study examined the relationship between belief in a just 
world (BJW) and mood change after subjects were exposed to an 
innocent victim within i. empathy-inducing and traditional 
observer conditions. 
The learned helplessness model of depression emphasizes the 
role of perception of noncontingency in depression. Following 
from this model, it was hypothesized that high JW subjects,be- 
cause of their higher need to perceive contingency, would expe- 
rience greater depressed mood change when asked to empathize 
with an innocent victim in a helpless situation. 
127 female undergraduates were divided into high, medium and 
low BJW groups and completed the following pre-measures: l) 
rating of the '^average female college student" along 15 bi- 
polar adjectives; 2)  Depression Adjective Check List (DACL); 
and 3) Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL).  Subjects 
then read either observer or empathy-inducing instructions 
prior to a 5—minute audiotape of a policeman and an innocent 
female victim who reports receiving a series of threatening 
phone calls. Post measures were: l) adjective rating of the 
victim; 2) DACL; 3) MAACL; 4) attribution scale and 5) Likert 
item measuring expectation of future noncontingency. 
Analysis of variance results for a 3 (high, medium and 
low BJW) by 2 (observer/empathy) by 2 (pre-post) design indi- 
cated a significant overall derogation effect. For all mood 
measures (anxiety, hostility, depression) there were highly 
significant increases after exposure to the tape manipula- 
tion. However, differences between levels of BJW were not 
found for derogation or mood measures.  There was no differ- 
ential mood change between observers and empathizers. The 
attribution scale was not found to be a meaningful measure of 
the universal/personal attribution for helplessness dimension. 
These results are compared to those reported in the current 
literature on just world and empathy research. The results 
are also discussed in relation to a similar study which used 
a male population. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
Motivation and desire for personal effectiveness and 
control over important life events occupies a well-acknow- 
ledged position in viewing the individual human situation 
within clinical and social psychological theory and research 
(Brehm, 1966; Burger & Cooper, 1979; Kelley, 1971; Langer, 
1975; Lerner, 1970, 1977;f Walster, 1966; Wortman, 1975, 
1976; Wortman & Brehm, 1975).  The perception of an order- 
ly relationship between behavior and outcomes is essential 
to effective coping (Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Seligman, 1975), 
enabling the individual to set goals and impose some type 
of meaningful order on the world (Lerner, 1977; Lerner & 
Miller, 1978). 
Thus, as the perception of control is considered a 
beneficial experience for the animal or human (Burger & 
Arkin, 1980; Kelley, 1971); lack or loss of control is 
seen as both undesirable and debilitating (Abramson, Selig- 
man & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, 1975; Wortman & Brehm, 1975). 
Negative reactions to loss of control have been found as a 
generalized phenomenon not only in relatively artificial 
settings (Burger & Arkin, 1980; Hiroto, 1974; Overmier & 
Seligman, 1967), but also in more realistic situations 
involving reactions to success and failure (Kuiper, 1978; 
1 
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Luginbuhl, Crowe & Kahan, 1975) and the effects of victim- 
ization on observers and victims (Lerner, 1970, 1971a; 
Walster, 1966). 
Evidence of a control motivation (Kelley, 1971; Pitt- 
man & Pittman, 1979, 1980) has been found in perceived con- 
trol phenomena (Langer, 1975) and in general attributional 
biases in efforts to maintain control over the environment 
(Kelley, 1971-; Miller & Norman, 1975). 
People minimize the role of chance' in pro- 
ducing various outcomes, exaggerate the rela- 
tionship between their behavior and "uncon- 
trollable" life events, and tend to be un- 
aware of the extent to which their behavior 
is controlled by external factors. (Wortman, 
1975, p. 43). 
For example, in games of chance gamblers will behave 
as if they have expectations of control (Langer, 1975). 
In fact, people often fail to differentiate between chance 
and skill situations.  Langer refers to the tendency to 
perceive causal relationships when contingency does not in 
fact exist as the "illusion of control".  In a sense, such 
biases are complementary to the biases of helpless indi- 
viduals who have learned to underestimate personal 
effectiveness (Seligman, 1975). 
The perception of control is beneficial and adaptive for' 
the organism (Kelley, 1971; Seligman, 1975).  Subjects rated 
exposure to unpredictable aversive stimuli less negatively 
if lead to believe they had control, that did those 
correctly perceiving the situation as uncontrollable, and 
showed no subsequent performance deficit (Glass & Singer, 
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1972). Furthermore, research indicates that individuals 
prefer self-control (Pervin, 1963) and if allowed to control 
aversive outcomes, will in fact rate the experience as less 
aversive than if administered by the experimenter (Geer & 
Maisel, 1972; Wortman, 1975). Lefcourt (1976) concludes 
that prediction and control of aversive stimuli decreases 
negative response. 
Desire for Control and Causal Attributions 
Kelley (1971) links man's need to predict and control 
to man's inferences about the causes of observed behavior. 
The purpose of causal analyses - the func- 
tion it serves for the species and the ind- 
ividual - is effective control.  The attri- 
butor is not simply an attributor, a seeker 
after knowledge.  His latent goal  in gain- 
ing knowledge is that of effective manage- 
ment of himself and his environment.  He 
is not a pure "scientist," then, but an 
applied one. (p. 22) 
This assertion receives support from findings that 
deprivation of control leads to increased attributional 
activity (Pittman & Pittman, 1980). 
Causal attributions, however, are influenced by the 
need to believe one is able to control the environment 
(Langer, 1975), and in this way introduce biases into 
causal inferences (Kelley, 1971).  Pancer (1980) .identified 
attributions for success and failure along a stability/modi- 
fiability continuum, "ability" being stable and "effort" 
a more controllable factor.  The greater need to perceive 
control over performance outcomes and importance of 
the task lead to. more attributions made to controllable 
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causes (effort). 
To the extent to:..which attributions are bases for 
future control attempts, individuals will attribute success 
to personal factors and failure to external forces (Kelley, 
1971) and overestimate their degree of control over random 
events (Langer, 1975; Wortman, 1975). Conversely, control 
motivation theory suggests one is apt to underestimate the 
extent to which behavior is controlled by external factors. 
Indeed, evidence indicates actors will exaggerate personal 
control and deny situational constraints (Miller & Norman, 
1975). 
Individual Differences in Desire for Control 
Evidence supports the existence of individual  differ- 
ences in motivation for control and attributional style 
(Burger & Cooper,* 1979; Pittman & Pittman, 1979). 
Rotter (1966) developed the Internal-External Locus 
of Control scale to measure the degree to which an individ- 
ual believes reinforcements are contingent upon his behavior. 
Within his social learning theory, perceived control is oper- 
ationally defined as a generalized expectancy for internal 
rather than external control of reinforcements (Lefcourt, 
1976). Those internally oriented perceive both positive 
and negative events as a consequence of one's actions and 
behavior, thus, under personal control.  Conversely, those 
who exhibit an expectancy of external control would see 
similar events as unrelated to one's  behavior and out 
of one's control (Rotter, 1975). 
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Burger and Cooper (1979) developed a paper, and 
pencil personality measure of the "general desire for con- 
trol over the events in one's life" (p. 382). The Desir- 
ability for Control construct was hypothesized to account 
for some of the variation in learned helplessness reactions 
(Burger & Arkin, 1980).  The researchers found that those 
subjects high in the desire for control (DC) display greater 
cognitive and affective deficits in response to helplessness 
training than low DC subjects. 
More generally, the authors suggest that to the extent 
that the person has a high desire for control, he -will react 
more strongly than low DC persons to loss of control and1 
may be more susceptible to learned helplessness (Burger & 
Cooper, 1979j Pittman &. Pittman, 1980). 
High DC individuals are described as assertive, de- 
cisive, and active.  High DC subjects were found to exhibit 
the illusion of control phenomenon in a chance situation, 
whereas low DC subjects did not (Burger & Cooper, 1979). 
In a similar vein, Rubin & Peplau (1973) created the 
Belief in a Just World Scale based on Lerner's (1970) just 
world hypothesis which states that people are motivated to1 
believe that they will get what they deserve and likewise, 
deserve what they get.  Those high in belief in a just 
world have been shown to react differentially in situations 
which disconfirm their belief in a contingent world to 
those not suscribing to this belief (Milier, 1977j Rubin & 
Peplau, 1973). A more extensive examination of this construct 
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will be provided in later sections of this review. 
Reactions to Uncontrollable Life Events 
Walster (1966) notes with realism that "people have 
no real control over many of the things that happen to 
them" (p. 73), for such reasons as limitations in abilities, 
chance factors or external forces (Wortman & Brehm, 1975) . 
Congruent with previous discussion, people will 
exaggerate their influence over uncontrollable life events 
(Wortman, 1976). Further evidence suggests that individual 
victims of unfortunate circumstances may even blame themselves 
for their fate tather than admit to chance factors. Indirect 
evidence comes from studies of guilt in innocent victims 
such as cancer patients (Abrams & Finesinger, 1963), parents 
of terminally ill children (Chodoff, Friedman & Hamburg, 
1964), victims of natural disasters (Lifton, 1963) and 
women who have been raped (Medea & Thompson, 1974). 
Acknowledgment that unfortunate circumstances may 
befall a person through no fault of his own.may present 
an extremely unpleasant thought (Lerner, 1970, 1971a). In 
some cases, a person is more able to feel he could avert 
future misfortune by assigning causal responsibility 
(Walster, 1966) or perceiving the situation as having been 
caused by his own prior mistakes, behaviors or intentions 
(Lerner, 1970). 
While some theorists emphasize the nonfunctional 
nature of self-blame (Abrams &. Finesinger, 1963) and effects 
of such an attribution on self-esteem (Comer & Laird, 
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1975; Wortman & Brehm, 1975), others (Chodoff, Friedman 
& Hamburg,. 1964) point to the defensive purpose of self- 
blame in denying that suffering.is impersonal and mean- 
ingless.  Medea and Thompson (1974) discuss self-blame as 
a means of providing an illusion of safety in anticipation 
of future situations.  Bulman and Wortman (1977) suggest 
that self-blame may be less painful than admitting to a 
random world.  In sum, these studies raise the question 
as to whether the illusion of control is adaptive or dys- 
functional for the individualr(Langer, 1975). 
Little actual research has been carried out which 
specifically explores attributional explanations of victims 
of unfortunate life events and subsequent affective reac- 
tions mediated by different attributions (Lerner & Miller, 
1978; Wortman, 1976). Several researchers have questioned 
the interaction of personality dispositions in attributions 
for uncontrollable events (Comer & Laird, 1975; Wortman, 
1976). 
The present research project represents an attempt 
to address this issue 1) by examining the relationship be- 
tween the strength of control motivation and reaction to 
exposure to uncontrollable outcomes, and 2) by measuring 
variation in subsequent affective responses due to differ- 
ential involvement and attributional mediators. 
The remainder of this review will discuss the re- 
formulated learned helplessness model of depression 
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(Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978), and focus centrally 
on the just world theory (Lerner, 1977) and the convergence 
of these theories in explaining affective reaction to the 
perception of noncontingency in cases of unjust suffering. 
Learned Helplessness Model of Depression 
A person or animal is helpless with res- 
pect to some outcome when the outcome 
occurs independently of all his volun- 
tary responses "(Seligman, 1975, p. 17). 
Learned helplessness theory was ignited by studies 
(Overmier & Seligman, 1967$ Seligman & Maier, 1967) which 
investigated the relationship of fear conditioning and 
instrumental learning.  Naive dogs were able to learn, when 
placed in a shuttle box, to escape shock by jumping over a 
barrier.  However, animals exposed initially to inescapable 
shock did not master the escape task and displayed passive 
acceptance of aversive shock.  Such failure to initiate 
further responding when the environment was again controllable 
exemplifies the motivational deficit engendered in learned 
helplessness reactions (Seligman, 1975).  Similar results 
have been replicated in'."cats, rats, mice, birds, primates, 
fish, cockroaches and man" (p. 28). 
Hiroto (1974) utilized Seligman's experimental paradigm 
with humans, successfully producing motivational and cogni- 
tive deficits associated with learned helplessness effects. 
College students were exposed to pre-treatments of controll- 
able or uncontrollable aversive noise prior to an escape- 
avoidance  learning task.   The uncontrollable  noise 
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group exhibited passivity in the subsequent controllable situ- 
ations, suggesting that they expected future outcomes to be 
uncontrollable.  Such lack of initiative in responding leads 
to cognitive deficits, where failure to test new contingen- 
cies impedes learning that new tasks may be controllable. 
Additional studies with humans (Hiroto & Seligman, 1975; 
Miller & Seligman, 1975) provide further support for a 
learned helplessness theory of depression. 
From accumulated research, Seligman (1975) formulated 
the learned helplessness theory to encompass both animal and 
human data regarding exposure to uncontrollability: 
This, then is our theory of helplessness: 
the expectation that an outcome is inde- 
pendent of responding (1) reduces the moti- 
vation to control the outcome; (2) inter- 
feres with learning that responding controls 
the outcome; and, if the outcome is traumatic, 
(3) procudes fear for as long as the subject 
is uncertain of the uncontrollability of the 
outcome, and then produces depression, (p. 55-56) 
Note that it is the expectation of future helplessness 
and not merely exposure to noncontingency, that is critical 
in producing motivational, cognitive and emotional deficits. 
A measure of expectation of future noncontingency was 
included in the hypotheses tested in the present research. 
Miller and Seligman (1973) found that individuals 
scoring high on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) did 
not utilize information from a skill task to make better 
prediction of future success, leading the authors to con- 
clude that the individual perception of noncontingency be- 
tween acts and outcomes is a significant variable in de- 
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pression.  Seligman (1975, 1978) has proposed his theory to 
be primarily relevant to reactive types of depression. 
Dissatisfaction with Learned Helplessness Theory (1975) 
Wortman and Brehm (1975) have pointed out inadequacies 
in Seligman*s theory and put forth a combination of reactance 
theory and learned helplessness theory to achieve a better 
explanation of existing data. 
Reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) asserts that individuals 
will respond to perceived attempts to restrict their per- 
sonal control with increased motivation to reassert control. 
To the extent that an individual has an expectation of beha- 
vioral freedom in a particular situation, he will react 
differentially to uncontrollable outcomes (Wortman & Brehm, 
1975).  Similarly, the degree of threat is related to the 
level of reactance. 
Wortman and Brehm cite several areas of difficulty 
within learned helplessness research, such as methodological 
and interpretational difficulties, and more importantly, 
evidence that subjects exposed to helplessness training may 
actually become more controlling or show facilitation 
effects (Hanusa & Schultz, 1977; Roth & Bootzin, 1974; Tennen 
& Eller, 1977; Wortman, 1976). 
In response, they propose an integrative viewpoint 
which takes into account the extent to which a person expects 
to be able to control important events.  For those with a 
high expectation of control, experience with uncontrollable 
outcomes should at first motivate attempts to reestablish 
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control as a response to the threat of loss of. 
control.  The magnitude of the threat is proportional to 
the importance of the outcome, a point ignored in Seligman's 
theorizing.  Those people with no expectation of control 
•will not be, motivated to exert control, becoming helpless 
more quickly.  Thus, the greater reactance, the greater 
persistence in the face of uncontrollable outcomes• 
Most notable, however, Wortman and Brehm raise the :'■ 
issue of types of attributions which an individual can make 
for the cause of  his helplessness and their effects. 
They hypothesize that attributions of failure to unchangeable- 
factors such as personal or internal characteristics will 
increase resultant feelings of helplessness more than ex- 
ternal attributions. 
Other critiques have expressed dissatisfaction with 
learned helplessness theory and its supporting evidence 
(Blaney, 1977; Buchwald, Coyne & Cole, 1978; Costello, 1978; 
Rizley, 1978).  More recent literature has emphasized cog- 
nitive factors in helplessness-induced depression (Huesman, 
1978; Rizley, 1978), and several reformulations based on 
attributional analyses and alternate explanations of learned- 
helplessness phenomena have been proposed (Abramson, Seligman 
& Teasdale, 1978; Hanusa $< Schulz, 1977; Roller & Kaplan, 
1978; Miller & Norman, 1979; Pittman & Pittman, 1980; 
Roth, 1980; Zuroff, 1980). 
Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale's Reformulation 
Seligman and his co-authors acknowledge their own 
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dissatisfaction -with early learned helplessness theory. 
They respond with an outline of inadequacies which they 
address systematically through an attributional framework. 
"In brief, we argue that when a person finds that he is 
helpless, he.asks why he is helpless" (p. 50). Causal 
attributions are a determining factor in the generality 
and chronicity of learned helplessness deficits. 
Previous models have considered uncontrollability to 
be defined as response-outcome independence (Seligman, 1975). 
Yet such a definition fails to distinguish instances when 
an individual does not possess an efficacious response, but 
when others around him do, from cases in which all individuals 
lack a controlling response (Klein, Fencil-Morse & Seligman, 
1976; Kuiper, 1978). 
For illustration, consider the following examples: 
Case 1:  Spring melt and heavy rains have combined to 
threaten flooding of a residential section of town.  In 
spite of Mr. Jones' and his neighbors' efforts to sandbag, 
extensive water damage results to his home. 
Case 2;  In another part of town, Mr. Smith's newly-remodeled 
basement is also standing in several inches of water. 
Despite his attempts to remedy the situation, this is the 
third time his basement has been flooded as a result of his 
of incompetency in installing the plumbing in the new 
basement, 
Note that in both cases, flooding.and damage occurs 
independently of Mr„ Jones' or Mr. Smith's responses. 
Yet, in the first case, neither Mr. Jones nor anyone else 
can control the flooding.  As for Mr. Smith, while he is 
unable to prevent his flooding problem, presumably someone 
more knowledgeable about plumbing would be able to. 
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As events are perceived as noncoritingent, causal 
attributions for this state of affairs leads to differ- 
ential expectations for future response-outcome relationships, 
determining the chronicity, generality and intensity of 
helplessness deficits (Abramson5et.al., 1978). The reformu- 
lation would'classify case 1 as an example of "universal 
helplessness".  Since flooding is as.''likely to happen to 
Mr. Jones as to his neighbors, he is likely to attribute 
causes to external factors. On the other hand, Mr. Smith 
exemplifies "personal helplessness". "Outcomes are more or 
less likely to happen to themselves" (p. 52) than to others, 
suggesting Mr. Smith would attribute to internal or personal 
factors that his basement is flooded.  One would expect, 
then, that the differential attributions would produce 
different helplessness deficits. "Since 'I* is something 
that I have to carry around with me, attributing the cause 
of helplessness internally often, but not always implies 
a grimmer future than attributing the cause externally" 
(p. 56). While both types of helplessness situations may 
produce cognitive and motivational deficits, findings in- 
dicate self-esteem deficits occur only in cases of personal 
helplessness (Abramson, 1977; Garber & Hollon, 1980). 
Assessment of this attributional variable will be included 
in the hypotheses o£ the present research project. 
Initial learned helplessness theory (1975) offered 
little insight or explanation as to why helplessness deficits 
may generalize to either broad or narrow- ranges of new 
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controllable situations, or why differences in duration 
of helplessness effects occur.  The authors introduce the 
dichotomy of stable/unstable attributions as a way of ex- 
plaining whether effects will be long-term or transient 
(Abramson. et al. , 1978).  This distinction meshes nicely 
with other attributional analyses in the literature which 
utilize four attributional categories: 1) ability, in this 
framework an internal-stable attribution;'2) effort, internal- 
unstable; 3) task difficulty, external-stable; and 4) luck, 
external-unstable (Weiner, Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest & 
Rosenbaum, 1971). To complete the framework, attributions 
may be classified along a global/specific continuum, where 
global attributions promote generalization of deficits to 
a wide variety of outcomes, and specific attributions will 
affect only situations closely related to the original 
(Abramson et al, 1978). 
Overall, then,.\internal, stable and global attributions 
promote most significant deficits with generalization to a 
wider variety of situations (Coyne, Matalsky & Lavelle, 1980; 
Miller & Norman, 1979) and extend longer into the future. 
Additionally, perceived importance has been shown to be 
related to degree of deficits (Bachus, 1979).  Support for 
attributional mediators in the 1978 reformulation has appeared 
in recent literature (Abramson, 1978; Raps, Reinhard & Selig- 
man, 1978). Seligman (1978) defends the consistency of such 
a model of depression in that depressives and non-depressives 
made helpless show similar deficits (Price, Tryon £< Raps,1978). 
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Attributions for Failure and Success 
Several researchers (Bradley, 1978j Miller & Ross, 
1975) have examined evidence for self-serving biases in 
attributions for causality.  Findings suggest that individ- 
uals wi^l accept responsibility for success (internal attri- 
bution), acknowledging such factors as ability or skill. 
However, in circumstances of failure, individuals will tend 
to attribute their fate to external factors beyond their 
control, thus, avoiding blame and decreasing .responsibility . 
in a self-protective manner (Kuiper, 1978; Larson, 1977; 
Luginbuhl, Crowe & Kahan, 1975).  This pattern of attribu- 
tions for failure and success serve to enhance feelings of 
control (Kelley, 1971). 
In a review of the research in this area, Miller and 
Ross (1975)  found evidence of a self-enhancement bias for 
success, but only equivocal evidence for a self-protective 
motivation in attributions for failure.  Zuckerman (1979) 
suggests that evidence that individuals tend to accept 
credit for success and deny failure is mediated by the need 
to maintain self-esteem. When self-esteem needs are aroused, 
evidence for self-serving biases is strong (Larson, 1977). 
Bradleyj(1978) also found support for defensive attributions 
when the variables of choice, ego involvement and public 
versus private attributions were taken into account. 
Self-defeating Biases 
It would appear that depressives tend to attribute 
failure to internal factors (Comer & Laird, 1975; Klein, 
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Fencil-Morse & Seligman, 1976; Miller & Norman, 1979; Tennen 
& Eller, 1977), suggesting a self-defeating bias rather than 
a self-serving bias as found in normal populations.  Such a 
characteristic attributional style would facilitate deficits 
as outlined in the Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale reformula- 
tion.  Evidence is supportive that depressives generally 
attribute failure to internal, global and stable traits 
(Hammen.& Krantz, 1976; Klein et al., 1976; Rizley, 1978) 
and success to external and specific factors•  Rizley found 
depressives tend to over-attribute causality to the self. 
Klein et al. were able to demonstrate that depressives exhi- 
bited greater performance deficits when attributing failure 
internally than externally. 
These trends, then, are congruent with predicted defi- 
cits and attributional mediators outlined in the Abramson, 
Seligman and Teasdale 1978 reformulation.  Such individual 
differences between attributions of depressives and non-de- 
pressives (Comer & Laird, 1975; Kuiper, 1978) are significant 
in examining the learned helplessness model of depression. 
Emotional Deficits of Learned Helplessness 
According to theory, (Abramson.et al., 1978) loss of 
a desired outcome or occurence of a negative outcome leads 
to affective deficits that do not result from expectation 
of uncontrollable success.  Evidence is supportive of this 
distinction (Griffith, 1977). 
Gatchel, Paulus and Maples (1975) examined mood 
correlates of learned helplessness with the use of the 
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Multiple Affect Adjective Cheek List, "After exposure 
to inescapable noise, as in the Hiroto and Seligman (1975) 
experiment^ subjects exhibited mood changes similar to 
symptoms found in characteristics of depression.  Inescap- 
able noise subjects rated themselves as more depressed, 
anxious and hostile following helplessness trials:. Griffith 
(1977) sho-wed that noncontingent failure changes mood in the 
direction towards depression, while exposure to uncontroll- 
able success effected changes away from depression.  Other 
studies have examined high and low helplessness subjects, 
finding high helpless subjects to be more depressed, and 
low helpless subjects more hostile (Pittman & Pittman, 1979). 
Evidence of mood change has been criticized (Buchwald, 
Coyne & Cole, 1978; Wortman, 1976) for being nonspecific 
in relation to actual depression, as well-, as for the transiency 
of such effects. 
Nevertheless, evidence of increased emotionality has 
been cited as support for a model of reactive depression 
in man (Miller & Seligman, 1975; Seligman, 1978).  Reactive 
depression is rooted in feelings of loss of control over 
outcomes (Seligman, 1975).  Miller and Norman (1979) des- 
cribe the chronology of reactive depression within an 
attributional view.  As an individual is exposed to 
noncontingent negative outcomes, causal attributions shift 
from external, variable and specific to internal, stable 
and general attributions.  As this shift affects future 
expectancies, deficits occur which sustain this maladaptive 
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attributional style and actual success is disregarded. 
Researchers and clinicians, however, have been quick 
to question the relevancy of learned helplessness to clinical 
depression, highlighting the many definitional difficulties 
in depressive disorders (DePue & Monroe, 1978). Thus, while 
advocates put forth learned helplessness theory as having 
potential in clarifying the nature of depressive disorders, 
complexities remain (Huesman, 1978). 
Seligman (1978) justifies examination of mild depression 
as a widespread problem in its own right and treats help- 
lessness depression as a subclass of depression.  He heartily 
encourages further and more definitive research with 
clinical populations. 
The present research will focus on depressed mood 
reactions to uncontrollable life events, representing a 
subset of learned helplessness situations in which uncon- 
trollable outcomes are primarily chance-determined rather 
than skill oriented. 
In a related vein, Lerner (1970, 1977) suggests that 
one way of coping with the presence of a chance-determined 
environment is to actively maintain a belief that the world 
is in fact just. 
The Just World Hypothesis 
Consider reading a daily newspaper.  Within it are 
many examples of undeserved suffering: a hit—and—run acci- 
dent; an innocent child abused; factory layoffs; cancer 
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patients without cures; communities devastated by wind or 
water. 
We do not want to believe that these things 
can happen, but they do.  At least we do not 
want to believe they can happen to people 
like ourselves - good decent people.  If 
these things can happen, what is the use of 
struggling, planning and working to build 
a secure future for one's self and fjamily? 
No matter how strongly our belief in an 
essentially just world is threatened by 
such incidents, most of us try to maintain 
it in order to continue facing the irrita-' 
tions and struggles of daily life. This is 
a belief we cannot afford to give up if we 
are to continue to function. (Lerner, 1970, 
p. 207) 
The occurence of such unforeseen and unpleasant circum- 
stances to acquaintances or even strangers produces a con- 
flict between admitting to injustice or assuming the 
unfortunate person in some manner deserved the consequences. 
Just world research examines the variety of ways in which 
people attempt to maintain their belief in a just world. 
In a recent review of just world literature (Lerner & 
Miller, .1978) Lerner acknowledged the roots of his theory 
in the observation that individuals tend to resent victims 
of circumstance and may in fact blame them for their own 
fates.  He suggests that this may be due to the desire to 
believe one lives in a just world, a world in which we can 
get what we deserve and deserve what we get (Lerner, 1970, 
1977; Lerner, Miller & Holmes, 1976)„  His theory represents 
a social psychological approach to the perception of con- 
tingency and effectiveness in one's environment, perhaps a 
more common sense understanding of issues similar to those 
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raised within the learned helplessness literature. 
Early research employed laboratory recreations of 
just world situations.  In his initial study, Lerner (1965) 
sought to measure this need of observers to see a fit be- 
tween outcomes for a particular individual and his personal 
worth.  Briefly, subjects observed two students who drew 
randomly for a cash prize.  Results indicated that subjects 
tended to see the winner of the draw as having worked harder 
to deserve his prize than had the loser, in spite of personal 
preferences (rated attractiveness) for a particular student. 
Belief in a just world implies a personal perception 
of deservingness, a distinct relationship between what hap- 
pens to a person and his behavior, a response-outcome 
contingency.  When a person is exposed to injustice in his 
environment, then, as in the examples in the newspaper, 
such an obvious inconsistency will be threatening.  An 
arbitrary world is both unpredictable and frightening in 
its implications that a person is no longer able to control 
his rewards and punishments by means of his own actions 
(Rubin & Peplau, 1973). 
A person motivated to maintain this belief in a just 
world in spite of evidence to the contrary may restore 
contingency and alleviate his anxiety in one of two basic 
types of cognitive -justificationst 1) attempt to compensate 
the victim (Lerner, 1970; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lincoln 
& Levinger, 1972); or 2) derogate the victim, thereby re- 
establishing a fit between behavior and deservingness 
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(Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Rubin & Peplau, 1973; Shaw & 
Skolnick, 1971; Walster, 1966). 
With this general overview in mind, the basis for 
such a justice motive will be addressed, followed by a more 
extensive review of the just world research findings. 
The Justice Motive 
Lerner (1977) cites  the common movie theme of the 
"good-guys" versus the "outlaws" and their predictable 
interactions as evidence that themes of justice and deserving 
are "uniquely central, powerful.'and universal in Western 
civilization" (p. 4), The "deserving" hypothesis (Lerner, 
1977; Lerner, Miller & Holmes, 1976) explains the seemingly 
contradictory social behavior regarding people's compassion 
or rejection of innocent victims. 
Lerner (1977) criticizes social learning theory by 
submitting that internalization of cultural norms is inade- 
quate alone to account for the development of a belief in 
a just world and focusses additionally on development of the 
individual locus of justice. The "personal contract" (Lerner, 
1977; Lerner, et al., 1976) evolves as an infant matures 
from the "pleasure-pain" stage which is dominated by the 
principle of immediate gratification to the more mature 
notion of delay of gratification, or the "reality principle". 
The child learns to forestall immediate gains in lieu of a 
better payoff in the future.  With the help of a stable 
environment, the child is able to visualize attainment of 
future outcomes which are more desirable and attractive, if 
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he is able to endure some amount of frustration in the 
present (Lerner, 1977).  This basic idea of "entitlement" 
develops with age into a commitment to deserving exnibited 
in adulthood, where it may be applied to increasingly broader 
areas of living.  "For most people, most of the time, the 
personal contract forms the basis of their goal-seeking., and 
psychological stability" (p. 6). 
With some thought it becomes apparent that observation 
of others * success with the personal contract is a means of 
evaluating one's own contract.  Preserving justice for others 
is a way of preserving justive for oneself.  The more impor- 
tant the contract to the individual, the greater motivation 
to eliminate threats to it, thus, the need to believe'in 
a just world. 
Experimental evidence with children's responsiveness 
and perception of deserving (Braband & Lerner, 1973) supports 
this developmental model.  Long and Lerner (1974) found that 
children high on a measure of willingness to delay gratifica- 
tion were more aware and responded to relative deserving in 
other children more than those low in this measure, support- 
ing a relationship between commitment to deserving and 
ability to delay gratification. 
Studies with adults have also found evidence suggesting 
people perceive a "norm of deservingness".  Subjects were 
more likely to help someone who both needed and deserved 
help than to help someone judged as having more than he 
deserves (Miller, 1977; Simmons & Lerner, 1968).  However, 
when concern for personal deserving become threatened, 
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response to the needs of others may be compromised (Lerner 
et al., 1976). 
Early Studies 
Lerner and Simmons (1966) is a prototype experimental 
situation in which a clearly innocent victim is observed 
to suffer through no fault of her own.  Female subjects were 
asked to observe another "experiment" in which a student 
received painful shocks.  They were made aware that the 
"victim" had signed up to earn experimental credit just 
as they had, only later learning that her participation 
would involve strong negative reinforcement for pair-asso- 
ciate learning.  Subjects watched a 10-minute videotape of 
the student receiving painful shocks with instructions to 
attend to cues indicative of the subject's emotional arousal. 
At this point, one group of subjects were given a chance to 
help the victim, by voting to assign her to another 10 
minutes of strong positive reinforcement, a neutral condi- 
tion or continued aversive shock.  Of this group, half 
were told that the subject would receive positive reinforce- 
ment as a result of the vote (known reward), while the other 
half were uninformed of the victim's fate (uncertain reward). 
Other experimental subjects were not given such an opportunity 
to compensate the victim. 
In addition, four conditions varied the degree of 
observed suffering.  Subjects were lead to believe that 
1) the observed event had occurred in the past (past event); 
2) the victim's suffering was terminated at the end of the 
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observed 10 minutes (end-point); and two conditions con- 
structed to increase perceived suffering, 3) the victim 
would undergo another 10 minutes of shocks (mid-point); 
and 4) subjects were told that the victim had agreed to 
undergo aversive reinforcement very reluctantly, and decided 
to go ahead only so the other students could receive credit 
for their participation (martyr condition).  All subjects 
were subsequently asked to describe the victim's personality 
according to 15 highly evaluative bipolar adjective pairs. 
This rating was compared against an earlier rating of the 
"average female college student" on the same adjectives. 
Results indicated that if given the opportunity, sub- 
jects compensated the victim by assigning her to positive 
rewards.  However, those subjects with no opportunity to 
compensate the victim had no choice but to devaluate her 
(Lerner, 1971a; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lincoln & Levinger, 
1972).  Characterological devaluation, ascribing negative 
attributes to a person, implies that person has acted in the 
past to make others suffer, and may act so in the future, so 
the present suffering may be seen as "deserved" (Lerner, 1974). 
As expected, a greater degree of injustice, as in the 
mid-point and martyr conditions, resulted in most harsh 
derogation.  Further studies have established a relationship 
between degree of injustice and severity of derogation (Jones 
& Aronson, 1973; Lerner, 1970; Walster, 1966).  Least nega- 
tive ratings coincided with the known reward condition, while 
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subjects in the uncertain reward condition, despite voting 
to compensate the victim, evaluated her negatively.  The 
authors suggest that devaluation -will occur when the ob- 
server is not reassured that justice has actually been 
reestablished. 
Condemnation of altruistically motivated victims 
(Lerner, 1971a; Lerner & Simmons, 1966,* McDonald, 1977; 
Simons & Piliavin, 1972) would seem to contradict common 
sense.  Further research by Lerner (1970) examined observers' 
reactions to a student who agreed to undergo a condi- 
tion involving either shock or no shock.  Results indicated 
that when observers believed there would be no shock in- 
volved the martyr was rated as more attractive than a non- 
martyr.  She was rated less attractive when subjects believed 
she would suffer yet in the future, suggesting that someone 
suffering for altruistic motives is more threatening to a 
belief in a just world than someone with less admirable 
motivations. 
In sum, research suggests that innocent victims will 
be devaluated in cases in which 1) the person obviously suf- 
fers; 2) the victim is not:compensated for this suffering; 
3) the victim has done nothing wrong to merit such a fate 
(Cialdini, Kenrick 8*  Hoerig, 1976; Kenrick, Reich & Cialdini, 
1976; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). 
Two Worlds 
Despite evidence of a justice motive, societal indiffer- 
ence towards disadvantaged groups is difficult to ignore. 
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Lerner (1977) postulates the existence of two worlds to 
account for this.  In one, the just world, the personal 
contract allows people to organize their behavior towards 
their goals.  In the world of victims, however, injustice 
predominates and personal contracts are not fulfilled. 
Justice theory assumes that citizens of the just world are 
at the same time still vulnerable to cues of injustice from 
the world of victims.  People would be willing, the theory 
goes, to give of themselves for the purpose of regaining a 
just world for all.  Yet, to the extent that one can not 
remedy all instances of injustice, they will remain vulnerable 
to the world of victims.  Hence, people are responsive to 
others• needs to the extent that it does not begin to 
compromise their personal deservingness (Lerner, 1977). 
Beyond that point, indifference or derogation may be the 
only means left to deal with such threats to belief in a just 
world. 
Helping the Victim 
Under what conditions, then, will a person be motivated 
to help a victim of unfortunate circumstances?  Simmons and 
Lerner (1968) found that having been treated unjustly oneself 
will increase motivation to assist others in the same situa- 
tion and decrease willingness to assist a person who has been 
"fortuitously benefitted"0  A person whose belief in a just 
world has been threatened by his own experiences will try 
to create evidence by helping others that the world is in 
fact just (Simmons & Lerner, 1968). 
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Observers are most -willing to help in cases in "which 
suffering can be alleviated most easily, such as an isolated 
event or a unique victim (Lerner,. 1977).  They will be more 
likely to help an individual rather than a group cause, 
and help in a situation that promises to be of short dura- 
tion as opposed to chronic suffering (Miller, 1977), because 
ineffective efforts to help will challenge the person's be- 
lief in a just world (Lerner, 1977).  Miller notes further 
than individuals possessing a stronger belief in a just world 
may feel more responsible for responding to injustice than 
those whose belief is weaker. 
There is even evidence to suggest that individuals 
with a high belief in a just world will behave more deserv- 
ingly by helping others when they themselves are in a time 
of need, such as before finals (Zuckerman, 1975).  This adds 
support to Lerner*s theory, suggesting that individuals be- 
lieve that deserving inputs are rewarded even in cases where 
there is no obvious connection between the response and 
outcome. 
Conditions of Justified Self-interest 
A final point of justice theory to be discussed here 
concerns deserving and the realistic difficulty in our world 
of allocation of resources.  We often follow rules of 
"parallel competition" (Lerner, 1977) in which the opportunity 
is equally available to all persons to pursue limited re- 
sources.  "According to the norms of justified self-interest, 
the winner deserves to win - as long as he didn't cheat - 
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and it was a 'fair' competition" (p. 19). To test this, 
subjects were given a chance to choose between an experi- 
mental condition involving shocks and a control condition 
with no shocks (Lerner & Lichtman, 1968).  In this case, 
subjects who chose the control condition, thereby assigning 
a partner to receive shocks, felt no need to derogate the 
victim.  Another study (Lerner, 1971b) with males replicated 
these findings that even if one causes harm to another, as 
long as conditions of investment, risk and opportunity are 
equivalent, one can feel justified in acting in one's best 
self-interest. 
In summary, the research reviewed thus far illustrates 
the variety of ways in which people attempt to maintain 
their belief in a just world when confronted with injustices. 
The person is faced with a conflict in which he must either 
become aware that the world may be cruelly injust or arrange 
his cognitive constructions and attributions such that "the 
only people who suffer in this world are those who deserve 
such a fate" (Lerner, 1970, p. 277).  Research findings 
would seem to support the latter choice. 
Perception of injustice is closely related to attribu- 
tion of causality or blame, such that maintenance of a per- 
ception of deservingness may influence attributions of 
causality (Chaikin & Darley, 1973; Lerner, 1965; Simmons & 
Lerner, 1968; Walster, 1966). 
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Further Conditions of Victim Derogation 
A recent review (Lerner & Miller, 1978) outlined 
conditions under which observers will devalue or derogate 
the "character or personal attributes*' of a victim who has 
suffered innocently. 
1) If subjects are able to provide behavioral justi- 
fication on the victim's part for having broughtinjustice 
upon himself, it is not perceived as an injustice and presents 
less threat (Lerner & Matthews, 1967).  Lerner (1974) reports 
a study in which MacDonald (1971) presented subjects with' 
a case report of a stabbing incident.  The innocence of the 
victim was varied such that in one case she appeared more 
behaviorally responsible for her fate than in another.  Results 
indicated that she was in fact derogated significantly more 
in the condition of less behavioral responsibility.  Thus, 
an innocent victim.'is more threatening. 
2) A high status or attractive victim is a special 
case.  Undeserved suffering of more attractive or respectable 
victims may be more threatening due to increased difficulty 
in assuming a characterological fault.  In such instances 
it may be preferable to individuals to attribute behavioral 
responsibility to the victim than to suggest characterological 
deficits (Lerner, 1970). 
Jones and Aronson (1973) examined such issues in a mock 
jury rape case.  Character of the victim was manipulated by 
identifying the woman as married, a virgin, or a divorcee. 
As expected, jurors assigned the defendant to greater pun- 
ishment for the rape of a virgin (most respectable) than 
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for the rape of a divorcee (least respectable of the three). 
At the same.time, however, the virgin was held most behav- 
iorally responsible. 
3) As mentioned previously, when the victim and obser- 
ver are both involved in a situation in which the norm of 
justified self-interest can be applied, no derogation is 
found (Lerner & Lichtman, 1968, Lerner, 1971b). 
4) Lastly, an important variable in determining a 
positive or rejecting reaction is identification with the 
victim.  When observers believe they themselves may be in a 
similar situation as the victim is presently in, they tend 
to pay more attention to external causes for suffering, 
rather than derogate the victim (Chaikin & Darley, 1973; 
Stokols and Schopler, 1973).  The issue of defining identi- 
fication and empathy will be discussed shortly. 
In sum, observers find it least difficult in an am- 
biguous situation to ascribe behavioral responsibility, 
especially for a respectable victim.  Such an attribution 
implies control over future outcomes.  If unable to find 
any actions which have lead to unpleasant outcomes, charac- 
terological derogation will occur, i.e. "He must have deserved 
it." While this attribution may require considerable displace- 
ment, it serves to overpower the threat of randomness or 
chance, over which one has little control.  "Attribution to 
some random 'chance'...would be to deny that its causes 
could be understood, making future accidents unpredictable 
and therefore unavoidable" (Chaikin & Darley, 1973, p. 274). 
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Individual Differences in Belief in a Just World 
While research findings generally support just world 
theory, individual differences do appear.  Lerner, Miller 
and Holmes.. (1976) reported that one third of the subjects 
in Lerner and Simmon's (1966) study did not derogate the 
victim at all.  Rubin and Peplau (1973) developed the Belief 
in a Just World Scale to assess such individual variation 
in the construct as earlier defined by Lerner (1970).  They 
assumed a measurable dimension which would be predictive of 
reactions to victims, whether persons would be more or less 
likely to derogate innocent victims.  Similarly, such indi- 
viduals scoring high or low in belief in a just world would 
have a greater or lesser need to perceive a contingent envi- 
ronment where both good and bad outcomes are always deserved. 
Rubin and Peplau made use of the 1971 draft lottery to 
test the extent to which high just world (HJW) individuals 
would perceive "justice" in randomly chosen winners (high 
draft numbers) and losers (low draft numbers).  It was hypo- 
thesized that high JW individuals would admire the "winners" 
more and evaluate the "losers" as deserving of their fate. 
Low JW individuals should not exhibit differential evalua- 
tions.  It was further hypothesized that high JW subjects 
would experience a drop in self-esteem if they were to "lose". 
Results indicated that overall participants were more 
sympathetic of losers than winners.  Among high JW subjects, 
however, this pattern did not occur. In fact, they tended 
to resent losers more than winners. While bad versus good 
outcomes had an overall effect on self-esteem, it was not 
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significantly related to just world scores.  Here is an 
instance in which overall derogation of victims was not 
upheld, yet taking into account individual differences yielded 
predicted effects,for those high in belief in a just world. 
Other correlational measures in the same study suggested 
just world scores are highly related to belief in God and 
inversely correlated with locus of control (high JW indivi- 
duals score internally). A strong correlation with authori- 
tarianism emphasizes that those high in just world believe 
"that strong and powerful people are good, and weak and power- 
less people are bad" (Sandford, 1971). Lerner, Miller and 
Holmes (1976), however, report some earlier unpublished factor 
analytic research which indicated that belief in a just world 
and authoritarianism measures did not tap the same construct. 
Other reported results are supportive of the construct 
validity of the Just World scale.  "Responses of people who 
were high on the 'Just World Scale* correlated with the be- 
lief that people can exercise control over their lives through 
effort and self-sacrifice" (Lerner et al., 1976, p. 141). 
With the introduction of the Just World scale, just 
world research began to examine more closely the relationship 
of individual attitudes and reactions to victims (Miller, 1977; 
Zuckerman, 1975). In a further discussion and review of just 
world theory and research, Rubin and Peplau (1975) affirm 
that high JW individuals will express more derogation of 
victims than low JW' persons.  From their findings they 
describe a high just world person as trusting, authoritarian 
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religious (Russell & Jorgenson, 1978; Sorrentino & Hardy, 
1974), tending to ascribe to the Protestant ethic (MacDonald, 
1972) and generally exhibiting an internal control of rein- 
forcements .  No clear sex differences have been found 
(Rubin & Peplau, 1973). Zuckerman and Gerbasi (1977a) have 
found high JW individuals to be more trusting, as -would be 
expected in that they exhibit more faith in the general 
fairness of the world despite evidence to the contrary. 
High just world individuals exhibit  trust toward others as 
well as towards authority and government. 
Lastly, it was hypothesized that personal experience 
with injustice may soften belief in a just world , across 
the variablesof sex,, age and social class, but evidence to 
date has been unable to verify this point (Rubin & Peplau, 
1975). 
Belief in a Just World and Locus of Control 
Several, studies have indicated a relationship between 
the belief in a just world construct and internal locus of 
control ( Lerner, 1970; Rubin & Peplau, 1973; Zuckerman & 
Gerbasi, 1977b). Such a relationship would support Lerner *s 
theory that belief in a just world results from a person's 
motivation to believe desired reinforcements are under his 
control.  A closer comparison of the characteristics of 
individuals with a strong belief in a just world and internals 
(Rubin & Peplau, 1975), however, found these constructs to be 
discrepant, suggesting the relationship is not as clearcut 
as originally thought. 
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Recent factor analyses of Rotter's Internal-External 
Locus of Control Scale (1966) have identified several compo- 
nent factors (Collins,. 1974j Mirels, 1970; Zuckerman & Ger- 
basi, 1977c), suggesting it is multidimensional in nature. 
Collins (1974) identified four factors, belief in a difficult 
world, a just world, a politically responsive world and a 
predictable world, which have been replicated in other anal- 
yses (Ryckman, Posen & Kuhlberg, 1978; Zuckerman, Gerbasi 
& Marion,' 1977) . 
Zuckerman and Gerbasi (1977c) noted that just world fac- 
tor items do incorporate "deservingness", or a contingency 
between output and payoff, as well as a control orientation. 
Theoretical similarity to personality measures and correla- 
tional data indicate this factor taps the same construct 
described in just world theory (Lerner, 1970). Internal scores 
on the just world factor correlated positively with authori- 
tarianism, dogmatism, intolerance for ambiguity and blaming 
women for their inferior state (Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977c). 
Such measures have also been shown to relate to high just 
world.scale scores.  From additional correlations with new 
items, Collins (1974) found that individuals scoring high on 
the just world factor of the I-E scale "believe in a strong 
causal relationship between the characteristics of the person 
(effort, ability, etc) and what happens to him" (p. 390). 
However, Zuckerman and Gerbasi (1977c) and Zuckerman 
et al. (1977) suggest just world factor items are relatively 
independent of the other I-E factors, belief in a difficult 
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•world, a politically responsive world, and a predictable 
world.  Discontinuity between attitude and personality 
measures related to the just world construct, such as 
religiosity, authoritariansim, respect for social institu- 
tions, lack of activism, which are not generally associated 
with an internal locus of control lead the authors to con- 
clude, "an apparent inconsistency between a belief in a just 
world and a belief in internal control suggest that the 
Internal-External just world items  should be replaced" 
(Zuckerman & Gerbasi, 1977c, pc 173). 
In conclusion, such factor analyses of the Internal- 
External scale have contributed to the understanding of 
the belief in a just world construct. Yet, findings that 
high JW subjects score internally are seriously confounded 
by a high loading on the just world factor items which are 
inconsistent with a generalized internal locus of control. 
Belief in a Just World - Attributions of the Victim 
Just world researchers have been concerned with the 
broad implications of their findings for attitudes towards 
social injustice and political issues (Lerner, 1970, 1977; 
Lerner, Miller & Holmes, 1976).  In contrast, the scope 
of the present project is examination of implications of 
the belief in a just world for the victims of uncontrollable 
life events.  How do high just world individuals react 
when they are the victims? 
Lerner and Miller (1978) have  criticized just world 
research methodology for lack of experimental realism and 
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involvement, unclear manipulation of behavioral responsi- 
bility and innocence of the victim, inadvertent variations 
of the victim's state of need or.characterological infor- 
mation and experimental demand characteristics.  The present 
study was designed so far as possible to avoid such 
criticism and at the same time provide a clear test of the 
hypotheses.  For these reasons, this project used an 
example of a victim of a randomly-occuring crime (threatening 
phone calls) as the experimental manipulation. 
Causal Attribution for Chance Outcomes 
Walster (1966) examined the causal attributional 
process for accidents and other chance outcomes.  The  greater 
severity of an accidental occurence, the greater need of 
people to assign responsibility (Phares & Wilson, 1972; 
Walster, 1966). 
And when we hear of an accident, for the 
most part we sympathize with the helpless 
victim of fate.  Often, however, if we 
feel the accident is a serious one.and we 
reflect on it at some length, we begin 
to have vague feelings that perhaps this 
accident was not beyond the victim's 
control. (Walster, 1966, p. 73) 
Viewing accidents as caused by external factors implies 
that such misfortunes could happen to oneself.  Walster 
proposes that observers attribute responsibility in a self- 
protective manner, attributing increasing.personal respon- 
sibility to the actor, or victim. In this way one is protected 
against the threatening idea that in the future one could 
fall prey to similar chance circumstances (Lerner, 1970; 
Walster, 1966).  Note, this is distinguished from the self- 
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protective function of external attribution for failure 
in a skill-oriented situation as discussed earlier in this 
review (Miller & Ross, 1975). 
Lowe and Medway (1976) assert that such self-protec- 
tive attributions that minimize the role of chance for 
negative outcomes, as discussed by Walster, will be maximized 
when relevance of the situation to the observer and potential 
occurence are high, as well as when actual causal data are 
left ambiguous.  Furthermore, individuals who tend to endorse 
personal factors as causal determinants of their own behavior 
attributed more ability and less luck to others for negative 
outcomes, and more blame and less favorable traits for more 
severe consequences. 
These data are compatible with just world data indicating 
that high just world individuals, who perceive a close fit 
between their behavior and outcomes, attribute personal 
responsibility to an innocent victim for his or her fate (Lerner, 
1965; Rubin & Peplau, 1973). 
Similarly, Sosis (1974) found that people who perceive 
themselves as in charge of their own fate tend to project 
their internality onto accident victims, judging a victim 
as personally responsible for  his fate.  Likewise, internals 
attribute more responsibility to others than externals (Phares 
& Wilson, 1972). 
Shaver,(1970) points out that several studies have 
been unable to  replicate Walster*s results (Shaw & Skolnick, 
1971; Walster, 1967).  Shaver proposes, instead, that obser- 
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vers will attribute misfortunes of others to chance, as a de- 
fensive attribution to avoid future blame or responsibility 
should the observer ever find himself in a similar situation. 
Counter to Shaver, Lerner (1970) sides with Walster 
(1966) in the observation that to the extent to which inno- 
cent suffering is dissonant with belief in a fair and orderly 
world, observers will change their evaluation of the victim 
by attributing personal responsibility, creating a fit be- 
tween behavior or character and the observed outcome. 
Attributions of Victims for Negative Uncontrollable Outcomes 
From the point of view of the victim, then, these two 
theories make differential predictions. 
Defensive attribution (Shaver, 1970) would suggest that 
a victim would attribute his suffering to chance factors. 
"The defensive attribution hypothesis suggests that people 
will prefer to believe in a capricious world rather than 
believe that they themselves are responsible..." (Chaikin & 
Darley, 1973, p. 269), and avoid self-blame for future 
misfortunes they may experience. 
Within the Lerner paradigm, the control motivation 
postulates that a potential victim would attribute nega- 
tive outcomes to behavioral or characterological factors, 
rather than chance factors, as chance is least controllable 
of these attributions.  "People make causal attributions in 
order to enhance their feelings of control over their envi- 
ronment" (Wortman, 1976, p. 23). Brickman, Ryan and Wortman 
(1975)  found support  for the  tendency to see  acci- 
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dents as controlled by behavioral rather than external 
events.  Thus, Lerner and Walster defend a defensive 
bias in the victim against viewing accidents as caused 
by external or chance factors. 
In an experiment examining these two divergent hypo- 
theses (Chaikin & Darley, 1973), severe consequences of an 
accident were more likely to be attributed to non-chance 
factors than mild consequences, replicating Walster*s (1966) 
results.  An accident with mild/severe consequences was 
observed by subjects who later thought they would be either 
perpetrators or victims in a similar situation.  Perpetrator- 
relevant subjects derogated the victim of a severe accident, 
whereas victim-relevant subjects did not.  Most important, 
however, future victims were more likely to avoid chance 
attributions.  By making future situations avoidable, they 
acted to avoid future harm, while future perpetrators acted 
to avoid future blame.  In a sense, then, support was found 
for both theories, suggesting observers and victims may make 
different attributions in similar situations. 
In this design, however, the accident involved clear 
roles of perpetrator and victim, unlike some real life 
situations.  Furthermore, since empathy and identification 
were confounded to some extent, an articulate picture of 
the victim's reaction to the accident was not achieved. 
Uncontrollable Life Events 
In her discussion of uncontrollable life events, 
Wortman (1976) states,"Individuals seem very uncomfortable 
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with the notion that such outcomes occur by chance" (p. 38), 
suggesting that people would rather blame themselves for 
a negative life event than admit to a random environment. 
However, few research studies have examined causal attri- 
butions for negative life events and conditions under which 
victims blame themselves.  ^ 
Most critical, it has remained unclear in the litera- 
ture whether such control biases and exaggeration of personal 
responsibility are adaptive or hinder effective coping by 
the individual (Lerner & Miller, 1978; Wortman, 1976). 
Bulman and Wortman (1977) examined the causal attri- 
butions of spinal cord injury victims for their accidents. 
In particular the authors examined the relationship between 
causal attribution of blame and subsequent effectiveness of 
coping.  Clear relationships emerged between self-blame and 
effective coping.  Conversely, external attributions for 
the accident was associated with poor coping as rated by 
hospital staff.  Bulman and Wortman interpret their findings 
as consistent with a need for control in such patients. 
Self-blame provided an order to the world and meaning in 
suffering in denying the operation of chance. 
Obviously such a population is unique, and does not 
suggest that self-blame is functional in all cases. In fact, 
as previously reviewed, Seligman and his associates (Abramson, 
Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Seligman, 1975) feel that self- 
blame and internal or personal attributions for situations 
in which a person is helpless may be maladaptive. In their 
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recent reformulation (1978) personal and universal 
attributions for helplessness were hypothesized to lead to 
motivational and cognitive deficits.  Affective deficits 
have been related only to attributions of personal helpless- 
ness, internal attributions for lack of control Abramson 
et al. characterize depressives as possessing an internal, 
stable and global attributional style for failures.  Rizley 
(1978) has confirmed that depressives attribute failure 
internally and over-attribute causality to the self. 
The present study sought to explore the victim's attri- 
butions for uncontrollable outcomes and relationship to 
subsequent mood change.  Three levels of belief in a just 
world (high, medium and low) were compared.  For this research 
half of the experimental conditions were asked to observe a 
"victim", as in a typical just world study, and the other 
half were given empathy-inducing instructions to facilitate 
identification with the victim and her plight.  In this man- 
ner, it was assumed that empathic instructions could produce 
subjects reactions as similar as possible to those of actual 
victims. 
Empathy and Identification with the Victim 
Lerner and Matthews (1967) discovered that identifica- 
tion with the victim tends to promote compassion rather than 
rejection.  Subjects will not derogate a victim they identi- 
fy with (Lerner, 1974).  However, in this context identifi- 
cation refers not to similarities in personality, "identi- 
fication with a victim requires  the  perception of 
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the same possible common fate and not the perception of 
similar attributes" (Lerner & Mattews, 1967, p. 324). 
Stokols and Schopler (1973) found that anticipation 
of future ineraction with the victim served to mitigate 
derogation effects.  And some evidence (Chaikin & Darley, 
1973) would suggest that potential victims exhibited more 
external blame to perpetrators of the situation.  Some 
life events outside of the laboratory, however, may not 
have obvious perpetrators of injustice. 
According to Lerner (1977), identity relationships are 
produced through empathic involvement with the observed vic- 
tim.  Aderman, Brehm and Katz (1974) manipulated empathy with- 
in a just world framework.  These experimenters replicated 
Lerner and Simmons (1968) study with three sets of instruc- 
tions, 1) original instructions, 2) "watch her", empathy- 
inhibiting instructions; and 3) "imagine yourself", empathy- 
inducing instructions which encouraged the subject to ima- 
gine herself in the place of the victim.  Derogation effects 
were found in all but the third condition, suggesting that 
empathy inhibits derogation.  Interestingly, though, empa- 
thizing observers described their mood as more aggressive 
after viewing the innocent victim than other conditions.. 
Lerner and Miller (1978) suggest that differential 
effects may be attributed to the subjects' concern with self 
and attention being directed to the experimenter rather 
than to the victim.  These explanations are congruent with 
the actor-observer hypothesis (Jones & Nisbett, 1971) which 
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argues that actors (victims) "will be more likely to 
attribute situationally (to external causes) and observers 
will attribute dispositionally, to the character of the 
person, in inferring causes of observed behavior. 
 Jones and Nisbett hypothesize that actors and observers' 
exhibit differential causal attributions as a result of 
differences in the information available to them.  Actors 
tend to see situational variables as salient, because being 
aware of their own prior history of behavior, they are 
aware of inconsistencies and instabilities in themselves. 
The observer, however, has less information and may assume 
a behavior to be typical of an actor, biasing his attribu- 
tions in the direction of dispositional. characteristics 
(Nisbett, Caputo, Legant & Maracek, 1973). 
Regan and Totten (1975) examined whether empathic set 
influenced attributions in a similar manner to actor-observer 
differences.  The authors hypothesized that an empathic set 
would encourage subjects to attribute situationally, rather 
than dispositionally for an actor's behavior.  Their results 
provided support for this hypothesis.  In empathy conditions, 
then, situational aspects of actors became more salient, 
whereas non-empathic subjects continued to attribute disposi- 
tionally.  They concluded that observers could, in effect, 
be turned into actors. 
Subsequent research has indicated that empathy induc- 
tion leads to a sharing of self-enhancing attributional 
biases (Miller & Ross, 1975), while standard observers 
page -44 
attribute dispositionally for both success and failure 
(Gould &: Sigall, 1977). 
Brehm and Aderman (1977) replicated earlier findings 
(Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974) that empathy-inducing instruc- 
tions lead observers to evaluate a victim more favorably 
than standard instructions, thus, inducing the actor's 
perspective.   Such studies provide the basis for empathy- 
based observer-observer differences which can be utilized in 
examining reactions of victims by using subjects instructed 
to be empathic. 
Miller and Norman (1975) found results that were dis- 
crepant from actor-observer attributions, however, reporting 
that actors accepted more behavioral responsibility and 
acknowledged greater disposition in their behavior than 
observers• 
The tendency for actors to assume respon- 
sibility for their behavior and to indi- 
cate that their behavior was consistent 
with their dispositions, may be seen as 
a manifestation of the need of the actor 
to perceive himself as exercising effec- 
tive control.  To the extent that actors 
allocate responsibility for their beha- 
vior to external causal agents (personal 
or impersonal), their perceived causal 
potency is threatened or reduced, (p. 512) 
Miller and Norman's findings suggest that desire for 
control and need for contingency in the environment may 
mediate attributional processes in the actor. 
Recent research has supported this contention (Burger 
& Arkin, 1980; Pancer, 1980; Pittman & Pittman, 1979, 1980), 
Individual difference, as measured by the Desirability of 
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Control Scale (Burger & Cooper, 1979) in the need to control 
life events, produce differential deficits after learned 
helplessness training. High DC subjects report more depress- 
ion than those low in desire for control (Burger & Arkin, 
1980.) 
These results indicate that individuals 
with a high desire to control events in 
their lives may be more susceptible to 
learned helplessness than are persons 
low in this motive. (Burger & Cooper, 1979, p. 391) 
Pittman and Pittman (1979, 1980) have also demonstrated 
a relationship between a high expectation of control and 
performance deficits and depressed mood.  Subjects wil lower 
expectancies displayed significantly less marked deficits. 
Wortman (1976) has framed this relationship within a 
social-psychological perspective, "There is also the poss- 
ibility that self-blame or devaluation is a response to 
uncontrollable outcomes adopted only by people with certain 
personality dispositions" (p. 46). 
Overview 
The present study attempted to show that persons high 
in belief in a just world are more susceptible to depressed 
mood when they themselves are victims of uncontrollable 
life, events (Burger & Arkin, 1980j Burger & Cooper, 1979; 
Pittman & Pittman, 1979, 1980)0  In a manner similar to that 
outlined in the Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978) 
reformulation of learned helplessness theory, the high 
just world individual's need to perceive a contingent world 
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should lead him to attribute negative uncontrollable events 
to personal or characterological factors before he will 
admit to chance factors in his environment and confront 
the threatening idea of relinquishing his perception of 
control.  Such personal attributions for helplessness are 
linked to emotional deficits (depressed mood) within the 
re formulat ion. 
On the other hand, as demonstrated in the just world 
literature (Lerner, 1970, 1977; Lerner & Simmons, 1966), 
observers of victims should deal with this threat by 
derogating the victim. 
To the extent that those low in the need to believe in 
a just world are less concerned with a rigidly contingent 
environment, exposure to uncontrollability was predicted 
to be less threatening. 
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Hypotheses 
1) High just world subjects will express more derogation, 
of the victim, as measured by a comparison of the adjective 
ratings of the "average female college student" with ratings 
of the "victim", than low just world subjects. 
2) For observer conditions, the amount of derogation will 
correlate positively with how much subjects believe the 
unjust situation will continue in the future. 
3) More depressed mood change pre-test to post-test will 
occur in empathy conditions than in observer conditions. 
4) Within empathy conditions, high just world subjects will 
exhibit more depressed mood change pre-test to post-test 
than low just world subjects. 
5) Within observer conditions, high just world subjects will 
exhibit less depressed mood change from pre-test to 
post-test than low just world subjects. 
6) Within empathy conditions, a high degree of depressed 
mood at post-test will be positively related to strength 
of belief in future noncontingency. 
7) Within empathy conditions, a high degree of depressed 
mood at post-test will be positively correlated with 
attributions to personal helplessness. 
8) Belief in a just world will correlate  positively with 





The present study employed two primary variables. 
The first, belief in a just -world, was divided into three 
levels (high, medium and low thirds) defined statistically 
from screening data on the Belief in a Just World Scale. 
Across the belief in a just world factor, subjects were 
randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions 
which varied instructional set.  Half of the subjects re- 
ceived empathy-inhibiting (observer condition) instructions 
prior to the experimental manipulation.  The remaining half 
received empathy-inducing (empathy condition) instructions. 
Thus, subjects participated in one of six experimental 
conditions according to their level of belief in a just 
world and observer or empathy instructional set to which 
they were randomly assigned. 
Subjects 
198 female undergraduate students in introductory 
psychology courses at the University of Montana completed 
the Belief in a Just World Scale screening measure in class 
at the beginning of Winter quarter. Subjects from high, 
medium and low thirds of this distribution were later re- . 
cruited by phone for participation in the study.  They were 
randomly assigned to Observer or Empathy conditions at this 
time.  After subject loss due to no-shows and a tape recorder 
malfunction which invalidated data from seven subjects, 
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complete data was obtained for 130 subjects. 
Data from three subjects were subsequently not included 
in analyses because of their high level of depressed mood at 
pre-test. Criterion for exclusion was scores on both DACL and 
D-MAA.CL depression measures at pre-test which equalled or 
exceeded two standard deviations above the mean reported for 
a normal college population (Lubin, 1967; Zuckerman & Lubin, 
1965). 
Correlational analyses included 127 subjects, divided 
into 65 observers and 62 empathizers.  Analysis of variance 
computations included 108 total subjects.  19 subjects were 
randomly discarded from the total 127 to achieve equal cell 
sizes of 18 per group. 
Subjects earned one hour of experimental credit for 
their participation. 
Materials 
Materials developed for this research included: 
1) Cover story - (see Appendix I) A preliminary para- 
graph described the project as investigating "social obser- 
vation" and "emotional cues", a composite of background 
preparation given by other researchers in similar studies 
(Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974; Brehm & Aderman, 1977; Gould 
& Sigall, 1977; Lerner & Simmons, 1966). 
2) Instructional set - (see Appendix J and K) Empathy- 
inhibiting instructions were modeled after original Lerner 
and Simmons (1966) instructions and recent modified versions 
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(Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974; Brehm & Aderman, 1977; Gould 
& Sigall, 1977) which emphasize an observer role.  Empathy- 
inducing  instructions -were developed, from the same sources 
as cited above, and encourage the subject to be "empathic" 
with the victim.  Both sets of instructions were made 
relevant to this particular experimental situation. 
3) Case transcript - (see Appendix A ) A transcript of 
a woman reporting receiving a series of obscene and threaten- 
ing phone calls to a police officer was developed from the 
"What To Do About Annoying Telephone Calls'' pamphlet distri- 
buted by Mountain Bell and from a personal interview with 
Al Baker, Missoula City Police Detective in charge of the 
Sex Crimes Division.  Specific dialogue was constructed to 
produce a learned helplessness-like situation involving an 
innocent victim (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978; Lerner, 
1971a). 
In this case, receiving these telephone calls (negative 
outcome) was portrayed as unrelated or noncontingent upon 
the victim's responses,  The interview was ended by the 
policeman in a manner suggesting that there would be no easy 
solution, in this way facilitating expectation of future 
uncontrollability. 
From the perspective of just world theory, information 
in the dialogue communicated the necessary conditions which 
define an innocent victim: 1) the subject is unable to help 
the victim, 2) the person obviously suffers, and 3) it is a 
page 51 
random occurence and unrelated to the victim's objective 
behavior.  The information included in the tape did not 
readily suggest a behavioral or characterological justifica- 
tion for her suffering.  The transcript -was developed to fit 
the above criteria for this study and to be a credible, 
although not necessarily typical, example of such a crime. 
This transcript was acted out by an age-appropriate 
professional actor as the police officer and a female grad- 
uate student.  The simulated interview was present to the 
subjects as "real". 
4) Attributional measure - A 10-item scale was developed 
to measure personal (internal) versus universal (external) 
attributions for helplessness.  Five items were scored in the 
internal direction and five in the external direction, (see 
Appendix L) All items were theoretically constructed accord- 
ing to the self-other dichotomy proposed in the Abramson 
et al. 1978 learned helplessness reformulation: 
When people believe that outcomes are more 
or less likely to happen to themselves than 
to relevant others, they attribute these 
outcomes to internal factors.  Alternatively, 
persons make external attributions for out- 
comes that they believe are as likely to 
happen to themselves as to relevant others, 
(p. 52) 
Responses were measured on a 7-point Likert-type 
scale with ends anchored with l=Msagree and 7=Agree.  A 
factor analysis was computed post-hoc. (see Results section) 
5) Strength of expectation of future noncontingency - 
(see Appendix M) Responses to the question, "How many more 
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harassing phone calls do you think this woman will continue 
to receive after having reported her problem?" were rated 
on a 7-point Likert-type scale with ends anchored at l=none 
and 7=6 or more. 
6) Expectation of, future harm - (see Appendix M) 
Responses to the question, "How likely do you think it is that 
the caller will do physical harm to the woman?" were rated 
on a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored at 1 = not likely 
and 7 = likely. 
7) Level of involvement - (see Appendix M) A question 
was designed to check the manipulation of empathy-inhibiting 
and empathy-inducing set.  Subjects rated their level of in- 
volvement on a 9-point Likert-type scale, with ends anchored 
with the statements 1 = "I listened to how this woman reacted 
in this situation during the audiotape: and 9 = "I put my- 
self in this woman's place during the audiotape". 
8) General Subjective/Objective preference - (see 
Appendix M) Subjects were asked their general preference for 
viewing a similar situation from an objective or subjective 
point of view.  The read the following statement: "If I were 
to read an article in the newspaper about someone in a simi- 
lar situation as this woman I would generally:" and then 
checked one of the following statements, "be more concerned 
with the facts'! or "consider the woman's point of view". 
9) Credibility - (see Appendix M) Subjects rated the 
credibility of the •••manipulation on a 9-point Likert-type 
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scale, "I feel this was a believable example of women who 
receive a series of threatening phone calls", with anchors 
1 = No and 9 = Yes. 
10) Prior experience with obscene calls - (see Appendix 
N)  Subjects were asked if they had ever received any obscene 
phone calls and to describe how long they continued and how 
many calls they received.  Subjects were also asked if they 
had any close relatives or friends who had received such 
phone calls.  These questions were included to assess the 
possible effects of prior exposure to this type of situation. 
Instruments ————————————- ( 
Several scales were utilized for screening and pre-post 
test comparisons. 
1) Belief in a Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1973) - 
(see Appendix C) The original scale used by the authors con- 
tained 16 items, 13 of which were used in a new scale with 
seven additional new items.  The same authors (1975) reported 
internal consistency of .80 with a sample of 180 male and 
female college students, with a mean score of 3.08 on a 
6-point Likert-type scale anchored with "disagree" and " ■.'; 
"agree".  A 26-item version used with another college popu- 
lation yielded an internal consistency of .81,, with a mean 
score of 3.79. Present research utilized the 20-item scale 
(Rubin & Peplau, 1975). 
2) Desirability for Control Scale (Burger & Cooper, 
1979) - (see Appendix D) This 20-item scale was developed to 
measure "desire for control over events -in one's environment" 
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(p. 383). Responses are rated on a 7-point Likert-type 
scale with seven statements ranging from "This statement 
doesn't apply to me at all" to "This statement always applies 
to me". 
The authors reported an internal consistency (Kuder- 
Richardson 20 reliability) for the 20 items as .80 and .81. 
Test-retest coefficient was .75 at a six-week interval. 
They also reported discriminant validity from the locus of 
control construct (r=-,19) with the Rotter I-E Scale and a 
low correlation (r=.ll) with need for social approval as 
measured by the Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale. 
A factor analysis yielded five factors: 1) general desire 
for control; 2) decisiveness; 3) preparation-prevention 
control; 4) avoidance of dependence; and 5) leadership, all 
of which accounted for 55% of the variance. 
3) 15 bi-polar adjectives - (see Appendix E) This 
rating scale is standarly used by Lerner (Lerner, 1971a; 
Lerner &< Simmons, 1966) to yield a measure of victim dero- 
gation0  Subjects rate „the "average female college student" 
along a 9-point Likert-type scale with 15 highly evaluative 
bi-polar adjective pairs.  This index of attractiveness has 
a possible range of 15 to 1350  Subsequent ratings of the 
victim on the same adjectives are subtracted from the first 
rating to yield a comparative measure of derogation or 
attractiveness.  These two ratings were used in the present 
study as pre-post test measures of derogation. 
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4) Multiple Affect Adjective Check List, Today Form - 
(Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965) - (see Appendix G and H)    The 
MAACL consists of 132 adjectives  scored on three subscales, 
anxiety (21 items), depression (40 items), and hostility (28 
items)j with remaining items as fillers.  Subjects are asked 
to check all of the adjectives which describe their feelings 
"Now-Today".  This form was designed to. measure self-reported 
day to day affect or mood changes and instructions can be 
adapted also for studies with repeated measures of mood change 
(Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965) as in the present study.  It has 
been used recently in studies on learned helplessness and 
control (Burger & Arkin, 1980; Gatchel, Paulus & Maples, 1975; 
Pittman & Pittman, 1979, 1980). 
Zuckerman, Lubin, Vogel and Valerius (1964) report split- 
half reliability for a college population ranging from .79 to 
.92 for the three scales.  A seven-day retest coefficient was 
low (.15 to .21) as would be expected if measures reflect 
transient mood change as intended.  In a similar population 
these authors found high correlations between the three scales 
(.72 to .75). However, validity data showed differential 
effects on anxiety, depression and hosility scales in response 
to different types of stress. 
For ,the purposes of the present research, subjects were 
instructed on the initial administration of the MAACL to 
"describe how you feel nowV and after the experimental 
manipulation instructions were given to answer the check 
list by describing "how you feel after listening to the 
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audiotape". 
5) Depression Adjective Check List (Lubin, 1967) - 
(see Appendix F)       There are seven forms of the check 
list, comprised of 32 to 34 adjectives scored in both posi- 
tive and negative directions.  Internal consistency for 
females on forms A, B, C, and D range from .85 to .88. Split- 
half reliability coefficients for normal females for the 
same forms range from .92 to .93.  Alternate form relia- 
bilities ranged from t86 to .91 for females.   The , 
Today form of the DA.CL is proposed by Lubin (1967) as a 
measure of transient depressive mood.  It has been used re- 
cently (Raps, Reinhard & Seligman, 1980) in a learned help-.. . 
lessness experiment as a repeated measure tapping mood changes 
induced by helplessness training.  It has also been used 
similarly by Kuiper (1978). 
Lubin reports that the General form which taps "how 
you feel in general" correlates more strongly (.42 to .55) 
•with the MMPI Depression scale than the Today form, "how 
you feel now - today" (.32 to .47), suggesting the Today 
form measures more transient mood states. 
Directions similar to those for the MAACL were used 
with this scale (see Appendix F)  Forms C and D were admin.^ 
istered as pre-post measures of mood change.  Intercorrela- 
tions for these two forms for normal females is reported by 
Lubin as 091. 
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Dependent Measures 
The primary dependent measures were scores on the 
Depression Adjective Check List and Depression subscale 
of the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List which were 
repeated measures.  A comparison of adjective ratings of the 
"average female college student" and the victim yielded a 
measure of relative derogation.  A measure of attributional 
mediation was included with a 10-item scale constructed to 
measure personal versus universal attributions for noncon- 
tingency.  Strength of expectation of future noncontingency 
was also assessed.  Finally, a check was made on the mani- 
pulations of involvement (instructional set), and credibi- 
lity of the tape manipulation on a Likert-type scale. 
Procedure 
In the first week of the Winter Quarter, the Belief in 
a Just World Scale and Desire for Control Scale were admini- 
stered to males and females in introductory psychology courses 
at the University of Montana.  They were asked to provide 
demographic information such as name, age, year in college 
and major.  Females were then recruited by phone from high, 
medium and low thirds of the females1 distribution of scores 
on the Belief in a Just World Scale.  Subjects on the 
division between thirds were not contacted.  Each subject 
was assigned randomly to either empathy or observer conditions 
across all BJW levels and assigned a subject number which 
was placed on the appropriate experimental packet. 
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Packets contained either "observer" or "empathy" instructions. 
Subjects in all experimental conditions were run 
simultaneously in groups of 10 to 15 on the nights of 
January 29 and February 2, 3, and 4 in 12 total experimental 
sessions.  Both a male and female assistant were present for 
all sessions and were blind to the experimental conditions 
and hypotheses.  The assistants handed out packets according" 
to a prepared list of matched names and assigned numbers. 
The audiotape manipulation was held constant for all subjects 
with instructional set varied within the experimental packets. 
Subjects were instructed to fill out the experimental 
packet until they reached STOP,at which time they would re- 
ceive further instructions.  They completed the following 
items: 1) a cover sheet which included a modified consent 
form (see Appendix B), and information regarding age, sex, 
year in college and college major; 2) a rating., of the 
"average female college student" on 15 bi-polar adjectives; 
3) Depression Adjective Check List; 4) Multiple Affect 
Adjective Check List; Subjects read the cover story and 
then reached STOP.  Wfoen all subjects were finished to this 
point the experimental assistants asked them to turn to the 
next page and read the instructional set, but to go no 
further.  The tape was then played and afterwards subjects 
were asked to complete fully the remainder of the experiment- 
al packet. 
Post-measures included: 1) ratings of the "woman in the 
audiotape" (victim) along 15 bi-polar adjectives; 2) DACL:* 
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with instructions to rate their feelings "now after list- 
ening to the audiotape"; 3) MAACL with similar instructions; 
4) attribution scale; 5) strength of expectation of future 
noncontingency question; 6) expectation of future harm; 
7) observer/empathic self-rated involvement; 8) general 
subjective/objective bias; 9) credibility of the tape 
manipulation; 10) previous experience with obscene phone 
callers; and 11) subjects were asked finally, to write what 
they felt the experimenter was trying to test. 
Debriefing:  After each session subjects were debriefed 
as a group regarding the general purpose of the experiment 
and all questions were answered.  Subjects were informed that 
this was not an actual case and that usually such phone 
calls can be handled effectively by measures recommended 
by the telephone company.  Subjects were asked to refrain 
from discussing the results with other students who had not 
yet participated.  Subjects were told some of the possible 
benefits of the research and thanked for their participation. 
A. summary of the findings of the study was sent to partici= 
pants who were interested.  All students received experimental 
credit for their participation. 
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Data Anaysis 
Results were analyzed by a 3 x 2 factorial analysis 
of variance with repeated measures for three levels of 
Belief in a Just World (high, medium and low) and two 
levels of instructional set (observer/empathy).  The 
Ullrich-Pitz ANOVA program was used to analyse the data 
for derogation and mood measures.  Hypothesis 1 was tested 
by the main effect for Just World factor levels and victim 
derogation.  Support for Hypothesis 3 was tested by the 
two factor interaction of Observer/Empathy x Pre-posttest 
comparison for both depression measures.  Hypotheses 4 
and 5 involved the three factor interaction for Observer/ 
Empathy x High, Medium and Low Just World x Pre-posttest 
for depression measures.  19 subjects were randomly discarded 
to achieve equal cell sizes of n=18 for the Ullrich-Pitz 
program. 
Hypotheses 2, 6, 7 and 8 were analyzed by correlational 
methods.  Data analysis for Pearson correlations used the 
Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS) computer 
program (1975).  Correlations were based on n=127, and 
also broken down into observer group correlations (n=65) 





Pilot data for the tape manipulation are summarized 
in Table 1. A second tape was made after the initial pilot 
work and was used in the study.  It received higher ratings 
for believability (x=7.3, n=10) and credibility of the 
woman's response (x=6.7, n-10) than the first tape (believa- 
bility, x=6.8; credibility of woman's response, x=5.6j n=5). 
In the actual study, mean credibility rating for the 
tape manipulation was 7.06 (n=127) on a 9-point scale, with 
higher scores indicating increased credibility.  Highly 
significant increases in anxious, hostile and depressed 
mood for all groups after exposure to the tape would 
suggest that believability of the tape was sufficient 
for involvement in the experimental situation. 
Subjects rated their participation as observing or 
empathizing along a 9-point continuum (observer=l, empathy=9). 
Self-ratings correlated highly with actual group assignment 
(r=.52, df=125, p_<.001).  A. t-test further indicated signi- 
ficant differences between mean ratings of participation 
for observer groups (x=2,85, n=54) and empathy groups 
(x=5.35, n=54) (t=6.74, df=106, p<.001). Additional 
correlational data indicated there was only a slight rela- 
tionship between observer/empathy group assignment and general 
preference for objective/subjective viewpoint (r=.06, df=125, 
pj>.05) which further supports the effectiveness of the 
page 62 
TABLE 1 
Pilot Data - Tape Manipulation 
Tape #1  (n=5) X 
1) This was a believable example of women who 
receive a series of threatening phone calls.      6.8' 
2) The policeman in the taped recording responded 
to the woman in a similar way to how most police- 
men would respond. 6.8 
3) This woman's response to the situation of re- 
ceiving such threatening phone calls was    ' •.--:-'.«:.-,"'.. 
realistic. 5.6 
4) The audiotape you have just heard could be an 
example of a recent interview in Missoula.        7.8 
Tape #2  (n=10) 
1) The audiotaped interview was a good example of 
a woman receiving a series of threatening phone 
calls. 7.3 
2) The policeman in the audiotaped interview 
responded to the woman in a similar way to how 
most policemen would respond. 6.1 
3) The woman in the audiotaped interview responded 
to the situation of receiving such threatening 
phone calls in a similar way to how most women 
would respond. 6.7 
4) The audiotape you have just heard could be 
an example of a recent interview in Missoula.     6.9 
*Likert-type scale l=Strongly Disagree 
9=Strongly Agree 
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instructional sets.  General objective/subjective preference 
was unrelated to dependent measures of mood (see Tables 2, 
3 and 4). For empathizers, however, subjective bias was 
related to more universal attributions for helplessness 
(r=.26, df=60, £<.05). 
Dependent Measures 
A Belief in a Just World (3 levels) by instructional 
set (2 levels) by pre-post (2 levels) analysis of variance 
was calculated for the adjective ratings and all mood 
measures.  Summary data for the analyses of variance are 
in Tables 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. 
Correlational analyses for total subjects and observer 
and empathy groups are summarized in Tables 2, 3 and 4. 
Derogation  (see Table 5) 
Analysis of variance for pre-ratings of the "average 
female college student" and a post-rating of the "woman in 
the audiotape" (victim) along 15 bi-polar adjectives revealed 
a significant main effect for derogation (F=8.43, df=1,102, 
]D<.005). Overall, women rated the victim significantly lower 
than initial ratings of the average female collefe student. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that high just world (HJW) 
subjects would derogate more than low just world (LJW) 
subjects.  The BJW x Pre-post interaction was in the predicted 
direction but did not reach significance,(F=l.43, df=2,102, 
£=V243). ; 
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Hypothesis 2 predicted for observers that derogation 
■would be positively related to strength of belief that 
the unjust situation would continue in the future.  This 
was confirmed (r=-.20, df=63, £<. 05), supporting the conten- 
tion that derogation increased in severity as subjects 
believed the phone calls would continue.  However, the 
correlation accounted for only 4%  of the variance and the 
relationship cannot be considered a strong one. 
Additional correlational evidence suggests further 
that for observers (n=65), derogation was significantly re- 
lated to personal attributions for helplessness (r=.24, df=63, 
£<. 05) and conversely, universal attributions were associated 
with more positive ratings of the victim. It must be kept 
in mind, however, that this correlation accounted for only 
a small portion of the total variance.  This relationship 
was not found to be significant for empathy groups. 
Mood Measures 
A 3 (BJW) x 2 (observer/empathy) x 2 (pre-post) analysis. 
of variance was computed for scores on the Depression 
Adjective. Check List (DACL) and three subscales of the 
Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL): depression 
(D-MAACL), anxiety (A-MAACL) and hostility (H-MAACL).  There 
were highly significant increases in affect after exposure 
to the tape manipulation for all groups on all mood measures; 
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Depression  (see Table 6) 
ANOVA results for DACL scores showed significant main 
effects for pre-post increases in depressed mood over all 
levels of BJW and instructional set (F=34.98, df=l,102, 
£><"• 00001).  The main effect for instructional set was also " 
significant (F=4.89, df=1,102, JD<.03).  Empathizers exhibited 
greater depressed affect over both pre and post-^test measures 
than did observers. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted empathizers would exhibit greater 
depressed mood change than observers.  The instructional set 
x pre-post interaction, however, was nonsignificant (F=.03, 
df=l,102, JDX.86). Thus, hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 predicted a 3-way interaction for 
BJW x observer/empathy x pre-post, such that HJW empathizers 
would exhibit more depressed mood change than LJW empathizers 
(Hypothesis 4) and in contrast, LJW observers would display 
greater change than HJW observers (Hypothesis 5).  This 
prediction was not supported (F=.97, df=2,102, JD=.62). Thus, 
pairwise comparisons were not necessary. 
Somewhat similar findings were shown in the ANOVA 
results for D-MAACL scores (Table 7). The main effect for 
treatment was highly significant (F=56.32, df=l,102, 
£<.000001). An exception, however, was the failure to repli- 
cate the observer/empathy main effect found for DACL scores 
(F=1.23, df=l,l02, £=.27).  Thus, support for observer/ 
empathy differences in depressed mood is mixed. 
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As found with DACL scores, the observer/empathy x 
pre-post interaction (Hypothesis 3) was nonsignificant for 
D-MAACL scores (F=.32, df=l,102, £=.58). Furthermore, the 
BJW x 0/E x pre-post interaction (Hypotheses 4 and 5) were 
not supported by ANOVA results (F=.53, df=2,102, £=.60) and 
pairwise comparisons were not computed. 
Examination of group means (Tables 6 and 7) show evidence 
of a nonsignificant trend that low JW groups were more emo- 
tional generally over both pre-post measures.  This was a 
consistent finding over all mood measures. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that within empathy conditions 
a high degree of depressed mood at post-test would be posi- 
tively related to strength of belief in future noncontin- 
gency.  No significant relationships were found between 
these variables (DACL - r=-.14, df=60, £>. 05 ,• D-MAACL - 
r=-.ll, df=60, £>.05). 
Hypothesis 7 proposed that within empathy conditions 
a high degree of depressed mood at post-test would be related 
to attributions of personal helplessness.  This was not 
supported by correlational data.  For DACL scores, in fact, 
there was a significant correlation in the direction 
opposite that of the prediction.  Increased depression 
at post-test was related to universal attributions for 
helplessness (r_=.25, df=60, £<.05) .  A similar correlation 
for D-MAACL scores did not reach significance (r=.12, df=60, 
£>.05). 
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Anxiety   (see Table 8) 
No specific hypotheses were made for anxiety measures. 
ANOVA results revealed a marked pre-post increase in 
anxiety (F=57.13, df=1,102, £<.000001).  There was also a 
main effect for observer/empathy set (F=7.46, df=l,l02, 
]DO01).indicating that empathizers were more anxious overall 
than observers. 
The observer/empathy x pre-post interaction approached 
significance (F=2.5, df=1,102, £=.113). Thus, there is some 
suggestion that empathizers tended to become more anxious 
than observers. 
For observers, anxiety at post-test correlated nega- 
tively and significantly with strength of belief in future 
noncontingency (r=-.23, df=63, JDC.05). Increased anxiety 
was associated with belief that the woman would receive 
fewer calls in the future, but, of course, the relationship 
was too weak to be of practical significance. 
Hostility   (see Table 9) 
No specific hypotheses were made regarding hostility 
scores.  However, it is of interest because of its inclusion 
in previous research investigating observer/empathy differ- 
ences in evaluation of a victim (Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974) 
as well as learned helplessness and deprivation of control 
studies (Burger & Arkin, 1980; Gatchel, Paulus & Maples, 
1975; Pittman & Pittman, 1979).  Wortman and Brehm (1975) 
have linked hostility theoretically to learned helplessness 
phenomena and Lerner and Miller (1978) have suggested that 
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a ^relationship may exist between hostility and derogation. 
ANOVA results indicated a highly significant pre-post 
main effect for increased hostile mood (F=95.69, df=1,102, 
£<.000001).  There was a nonsignificant trend suggesting 
that LJW subjects were more hostile overall than HJW (F=2.!10, 
df_=2,102, £=.125).  Correlational evidence also points to 
a relationship between LJW scores and increasedhostility 
at post-test (r=-.21, df=125, £<£.01), although the magnitude 
of the relationship is small. 
The main effect for observer/empathy did not reach 
significance (F=1.57, df=l,102, £=.21). 
Desire for Control 
Hypothesis 8 predicted a positive correlation between 
Belief in a Just World and Desire for Control scores.  In 
fact, a marginally significant negative correlation was 
found (r=-,13, df=125, £=.07), suggesting there exists only 
a minimal overlap between these two constructs. 
Universal/Personal Attribution 
Factor Analysis - (see Tables 10, 11 and 12) The 
Personal versus Universal Attribution for Helplessness Scale 
contains 10 items which pertain specifically to the situation 
of the victimized woman in'the audiotape.  Five were worded 
to describe personal attributions for the woman's helpless- 
ness, "Something about this person may have had to do with 
why she was receiving threatening phone calls." Five items 
were worded as universal attributions, "Women who receive 
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these kinds of bothersome phone calls can't really do much 
about them."  The full scale can be found in Appendix L•. 
Data from 51 subjects in empathy conditions were used in 
the factor analysis computations. 
Five factors with eigenvalues greater than one were 
computed from the correlational matrix (Table 10). 
Seventy-seven percent of the total variance was removed by 
these five factors.  Rotated factor loadings were computed 
(Table 12).  If the absolute value of a loading in the 
factor pattern was greater than |.35| it was considered 
salient. 
Factor 1: This factor accounted for 22% of the variance 
and consists  of four items which all load positively. 
These items are worded such that they are attributions which 
deal with effort and action on the woman's part in handling 
the phone calls, endorsing the woman as trying as hard as 
most people would have to discourage the caller. 
Factor 2: This factor accounted for 15% of the total 
variance.  The two items loading on this factor relate to 
the average reaction to such a situation.  Endorsing that 
the woman reacted more emotionally than most women was 
inversely loaded, while the item "Everyone receives an 
obscene phone call sooner or later'! was positively loaded. 
Factor 3: This factor accounted for 13% of the total 
variance.  The two items which loaded substantially were 




Intercorrelations Among Test Items for Attribution Scale 
Item   123456789 
1 
2 ,12 
3 -.22 -.11 
4 .04  .54  .21 
5 -.15, .04  .10 -.08 
6 .20  .24 -.07 -.02  .18 
7 -.02  .40  .03  .39  .18  .20 
8 .05  .20 -.05  .17  .15  .04  .05 
9 .01  .04 -.08  .10  .17 -.07  .32 -.41 




Universal/Personal Attribution Scale 
Factor Loadings for Unrotated Principal Components 
Item I II 
Factor 
III IV V 
1 .141 -.303 -.664 -.124 -.073 
2 .797 -.085 -.114 -.196 .174 
3 .098 .165 .734 -.054 -.431 
4 .689 .082 .220 -.520 .092 
5 0185 .255 .230 .750 .337 
6 .496 -.192 -.302 .570 -.388 
7 .662 .403 -.038 .017 .227 
8 .242 -.631 .267 .094 .576 
9 .077 .844 -.329 -.030 .139 
10 .784 -.124 .067 .104 -.409 
Eigen- 
value 2.537 1.522 1.371 10234 1.064 
Pet. of 




Universal/Personal Attribution Scale 
Orthogonally Rotated Factor Loadings 
Item I II 
Factor 
III     IV V 
Communal 
h2 
1 .066 -.003 .-.623: k  -.331 -.266 .57339 
2 .788 -.100 -.186 .019 -.236 .72461 
3 .067 -.014 .863 -.065 -.099 .76419 
4 .861 -.037 .192 -.168 .036 .80899 
5 -.028 -.010 .103 .892 -il47' .82784 
6 .025 -.024 -.172 .177 -.887 .84918 
7 .664 .272 -.029 .351 -.121 .65307 
8 .255 -.830 -.157 .273 .125 .86903 
9 .200 .831 -.140 .259 .170 .84579 
10 .501 -.079 .193 -.048 -.718 .81312 
Pet. 
total 
var. 21.698 14.741 13.278 12.356 15.219 
Pet. 
common 
var.   28.072 19.072 17.178 15.986 19.690 
Percent total variance removed by 5 factors  77.29 
n=51 
* Loadings greater than 1.35/were considered salient 
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Factor 4 s Twelve percent of the total variance was 
accounted for by this factor, although only one item which 
related to the typicality of the crime loaded at all highly. 
Factor 5: This factor accounted for 15% of the variance. 
Two items loaded at opposite poles of this factor.  They 
related to the personal responsibility of the victim 
(personal attribution) in receiving the phone calls. 
It would appear from the variety of factors found that 
use of the attribution scale to tap the bipolar dimension 
of personal/universal attributions as defined in Abramson, 
Seligman and Teasdale (1978) is premature.  Furthermore, 
such a scale may often need to be constructed for a parti- 
cular experimental situation, as in this case, which may 
hamper generalizability to other research settings.  It 
should be noted, however, that Factor 1 does appear to tap 
universally oriented items, while Factor 5 is oriented 
towards more personal attributions. 
Data Analysis - Attributional data yielded differential 
results for observer and empathy groups.  For observers 
(n=65) there was a positive correlation between universal 
attributions and more positive ratings of the victim. 
Conversely, strongest derogation was related to attributions 
of personal helplessness (r=.24, df=63, p<.05) although this 
correlation did not account for much of the variance. The 
relationship was not significant for empathy conditions 
(r=.13, df=60, £>.05). 
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For empathy groups, there was a negative and signi- 
ficant correlation between BJW and attributions (r=-.29, 
df_=60, £<.01) such that high JW subjects gave more personal 
attributions.  For empathizers, women who had received calls 
themselves made more universal attributions for helpless- 
ness (r=.24, df=60, JD<.05).  As reported previously, 
increased depressed mood at post-test was significantly 
related to univeral attributions for helplessness (r_=.25, 
df=60, JD<.05) within empathy groups.  This is the converse 
of the prediction of Hypothesis 7.   However, it must be 
noted that all of these relationships are rather weak. 
Strength of Belief in Future Noncontingency 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the amount of derogation 
would be related to the degree to which observers believed 
the victimization would continue in the future.  This was 
supported (r=-.20, df=63, £<. 05) although the relationship 
was a weak one. A small but significant relationship was 
found for observers• strength of belief in future noncon- 
tingency and post-measures of anxiety (r=-.23, df=63, JD<",05) 
and hostility (r=-.21, df=63, £<.05).  It is not clear 
why increases in anxiety and hostility would be related to 
the expectation of fewer calls in the future.  This rela- 
tionship was not found for empathy groups. 
For all subjects (n=127) there was a significant and 
positive relationship between strength of belief in future 
noncontingency and universal attributions (r=.19, df=125, 
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£<.05) although this did not account for a large amount of 
the variance. 
As would be expected, expectation of future calls and 
liklihood of physical harm were positively related (r=.32, 
df=125, JD<.01). People who had received calls themselves 
had a greater expectation of future noncontingency (r=.17, 
df=125, JD<.05) although this relationship was weak. 
Likelihood of Physical Harm 
Rated likelihood of physical harm to the victim was 
not correlated significantly with any of the dependent! 
measures of nood.  Thus, expectations of violence did not 
appear to have a biasing effect on dependent measures. 
While it did not account for much of the variance, this 
measure was correlated with derogation (r=-.17, df=125, 
JD<C.05) indicating derogation was associated somewhat with 
expectation of future harm. 
As previously mentioned, expectation of future calls 
was significantly and positively related to expectation of 
physical harm (r=32, df=125, JD<.05), accounting for about 
10% of the variance. 
Rated involvement 
Rated involvement was substantially correlated with 
observer/empathy group assignment (r=.52, df=125, p><.001) 
supporting the effectiveness of the instructional sets. 
For empathizers, ratings of empathic involvement were 
significantly and positively correlated with univeral 
attributions (r=.39, df=60, £<,001).  This is supportive of 
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the tendency of actors to attribute situationally (universal) 
rather than dispositionally (personal). 
Notably9   self-ratings of empathic involvement for 
all groups (n=127) were moderately correlated with dependent 
measures of mood (DACL - r=.40, df=125, £<.01; D-MAACL - 
r=.25, df=125, £<.01j A-MAACL - r=.34, df=125, £<.01j 
H-MAACL - r=.29, df=125, £<.01).  These results suggest 
that actual rated participation as empathizing may be more 
salient to predictions than just examination of observer/ 
empathy group assignment.  This is an important consideration 
for future research.  Much of the current empathy research, 
has not included a check on the manipulation of empathic 
involvement. 
General Subjective/Objective Viewpoint 
For empathizers,(n=62), subjective preference was 
significantly related to attributions of universal helpless- 
ness (r=.26, df=605 £<.05) although this accounted for only 
a small part of the variance. 
Rated preference for general objective or subjective 
point of view was not significantly correlated with any 
other measures, suggesting that it was not a biasing factor. 
Previous Experience with Obscene Calls 
Seventy-two percent of the subjects reported having 
received obscene phone calls personally.  Fifty percent 
reported having a close friend or relative who had 
received such calls (n=127).  Previous personal experience 
was signif icantly, .,but not highly, negatively correlated 
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■with post-measures of anxiety and depression (A-MAACL - 
r=-.15, df=125, £<.05; D-MAACL - r=-.22, df=125, £<.01) 
suggesting previous experience moderates to some extent 
mood effects in this setting.  Previous personal experience 
■was positively and significantly related to universal 
attributions (r_=.20, df=125, JD<.05) and strength of belief 
in future noncontingency (r_=.17, df=125, JD .05) although 
these correlations accounted for little of the variance. 
Having close friends who had received obscene phone 
calls was positively correlated with general subjective 
bias for empathizers (r=.30, df=60, JD<,01), but the rela- 
tionship was not high.  For observers this measure was 
positively related to expectation of physical harm (r_=..21, 
df = 63, £<.05 and credibility of the tape manipulation 
(r=.26, df=63, JD<.05). Again, though, the relationships 




Over all conditions highly significant increases in 
anxious, hostile and depressed mood after exposure to the 
experimental situation were found, indicating that the 
interview with the victim had a marked impact.  The experi- 
mental manipulation, then, appeared to be both credible and 
involving. 
Expected differences between observers and empathizers 
(Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974; Brehm & Aderman, 1977) in the 
amount of mood change were not found.  Amount of pre-posttest 
mood change did not differentiate observers from empathizers. 
Lack of clear observer/empathy differences in mood change 
does not appear to be due to inadequate involvement on the 
part of the empathizers, but more likely can be attributed 
to the remarkable involvement (affect change) exhibited by 
those subjects instructed to remain objective (observers), 
i.e. both groups demonstrated increases in affect after 
exposure to the tape.  In addition, self-rated empathic 
involvement was more highly related to the amount of affect 
at post-test than empathy instructional set assignment. 
Previously found observer/empathy differences in 
derogation, such that empathizers did not derogate the victim 
(Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 1974; Lerner & Matthew, 1967; Stokols 
&< Schopler, 1973), were not replicated in the present study. 
A highly significant derogation effect was found over all 
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empathy and observer groups.  Interestingly, a replication 
of this study (with minor modifications) was later run with 
male subjects (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1)  and 
also failed to find significant observer/empathy differences 
in derogation, although overall there was a significant 
trend for the victim to be rated more positively instead 
of being derogated.   One explanation for the failure to 
find observer/empathy differences in derogation may be that, 
as previously noted, the observers reported mood changes 
similar to empathizers, suggesting that the realism and 
intensity of the manipulation may have obscured the expected 
observer/empathy effects. 
The derogation effect well-documented in the just world 
literature.(Lerner & Matthews, 1967; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; 
Simons & Piliavin, 1972; Sorrentino & Hardy, 1973) was 
found across all groups in the present study.  Furthermore, 
for observers, derogation was significantly, although not 
strongly, related to the extent to which subjects believed 
the situation would continue in the future.  As previously 
mentioned, data for a male population (Sturm, Means, Fox 
& Retzlaff, Note 1) was contradictory, finding a significant 
overall trend for increased positive ratings of the victim 
as compared to the average female college student.  The 
predicted differences in derogation for levels of belief 
in a just world, that high just world subjects would 
derogate more severely than low just world individuals, 
was not supported in this research.  While data for both 
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females and males (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1) 
indicated that high just world persons rated the victim 
more harshly,  this was not a significant finding. 
Marked differences between males and females in the 
derogation response suggest that the sex variable should 
be examined to increase generalizability of just world 
effects beyond the experimental laboratory to social situ- 
ations which may involve both males' and females' responses 
to innocent victims. 
Lerner and Simmons (1966) justified the use of same- 
sex observers and victims because "females would be more 
i 
likely than males to exhibit compassion - thus providing 
the clearest test of the hypotheses" (footnote, p. 205), 
and this has been followed by others in the just world para- 
digm (Apsler & Friedman, 1975;     Ciaidini, Kenrick & Hoerig, 
1976; Schopler & Stokols, 1973).  However, more "compassion- 
ate" reactions exhibited by males in the present paradigm 
would call into question whether conclusions based solely 
on same-sex designs are justified. 
More recent empathy research (Aderman, Brehm & Katz, 
1974; Brehm & Aderman, 1977) has also avoided the admittedly 
problematic interpretation of cross-sex empathy.  However, 
results from the present research suggest  that important 
effects may be overlooked if sex variables in observer/ 
empathy evaluations are not examined.  Thus, both just 
world research and empathy research have generally ignored 
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sex variables which may have importance.  Future research 
should investigate empathy between sexes as well as for 
same-sex subjects.  Furthermore, just world research should 
examine reactions to male victims as well as female victims. 
Hypothesized differences for levels of belief in a 
just world on mood change measures failed to find support. 
No significant differences were found between high, medium 
and low just world groups for depression, anxiety or :./••.'.-!■.i.'i ii-- 
hostility mood change measures.  An inspection of group 
means for female subjects, however, reveals a consistent 
order effect across mood measures, such that low just 
world subjects reported greater anxiety, hostility and de- 
pression on both pre and post mood measures than high just 
world subjects, or medium groups which fell in between. 
Data from a similar study with males (Sturm, Means, Fox & 
Retzlaff, Note 1) found significant main effects for levels 
of belief in a just world on depression and hostility 
measures, with low just world subjects exhibiting the 
greatest depression and hostility.  With all of these results 
ordered in the same direction, one can say with some confi- 
dence that low just world individuals overall rated them- 
selves as more emotional than highs. 
Hypotheses regarding differential observer/empathy 
increases in depressed mood over levels of belief in a just 
world were not supported.  It does not appear that high just 
world individuals are more likely than low just world 
individuals to become depressed when asked to empathize with 
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a victim who is perceived to have little control over the 
outcomes in a situation. 
Although it was hypothesized that Belief in a Just 
World scores and Desire for Control scores would be highly 
related, the correlation was negative and nonsignificant. 
This suggests that the need to believe that one "gets 
what one deserves and deserves what one gets" is largely 
unrelated to the control motivation as measured by the 
Desire for Control scale. 
All subjects exhibited an increase in depressed mood 
after exposure to a noncontingent situation (tape manipu- 
lation) as would be predicted from the learned helplessness 
model of depression (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 3,978). 
However, support for the learned helplessness model was 
mixed.  Subjects also showed increased anxious and hostile 
mood.  All mood measures were highly correlated, suggesting 
that there was little differential mood reaction.  Within 
empathy conditions, contrary to prediction, a high degree of 
depressed mood (DACL) at post-test was positively correlated 
with universal rather than personal attributions for help- 
lessness.   D-MAACL scores indicated a similar trend. 
This evidence is admittedly weak, but it fails to support 
the  proposed relationship between personal attributions 
for helplessness and depressed affect (Abramson, Seligman & 
Caution should be exercised in interpretation of attribution 
scale scores. The first analysis of the scale in the present 
research revealed five individual factors. 
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Teasdale, 1978).   Furthermore, the hypothesized relationship 
between strength of belief in future noncontingency and 
depressed mood was not supported. 
Beyond finding increases in depressed mood after expo- 
sure to an uncontrollable situation, these results are not 
clearly supportive of the theoretical model of depression as 
stated by Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978).  The 
learned helplessness reformulation theorized that a belief 
in future noncontingency and personal attributions for help- 
lessness would lead to increased depression.  These relation- 
ships were not found, to be significant.  However, these 
measures in the present study alone do not constitute a 
complete test of the new attributional model. 
Data for the males (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1) 
revealed a significant interaction for levels of belief in a 
just world and pre-post measures of hostility, such that 
low just world individuals exhibited greater increases in 
hostile mood than high just world individuals. For females, 
overall highly significant increases in hostility were found. 
Such increases in hostility may be related to Wortman and 
Brehm's (1975) reactance theory of depression which acknow- 
ledges that hostility may preceed the development of de-v; •••■•: 
pression.  In a similar vein, Lerner and Miller (1978) 
suggested that anger may be an initial stage'of the dero- 
gation process.  The interaction found between levels of 
belief in a just world and hostility  suggests that further 
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investigation of the connection between anger and derogation 
is warranted.  Further examination of the specific inter- 
action between depression and hostility within the learned 
helplessness model is also necessary. 
Two methodological notes should be mentioned.  First of 
all, it is recommended that self-ratings of observer/empathy 
involvement should be included in empathy research as a 
check on the manipulation of instructional set.  In the 
present study, self-ratings were more powerful correlates 
of mood change than observer/empathy group assignment. 
It may be that in future research, divisions of "observer" 
and "empathizer" according to self-ratings of involvement 
may give clearer results. 
Secondly, although the present study used a manipulation 
high in "realism",,no differences were found between high 
just world and low just world believers in the derogation 
effect.  In fact, in a similar study conducted with male 
subjects (Sturm, Means, Fox & Retzlaff, Note 1) the victim 
tended to be rated more positively.  This pattern of results 
is contradictory to findings in the just world literature 
reported by Lerner and Miller (1978).  These findings suggest 
that generalizing conclusions from laboratory settings 
such as those  of Lerner in which "victims" are shocked 
as part of a paired associate learning task, to real 
world situations of victimization is questionable.  In 
addition, experimental findings which do not examine both 
sexes* reactions to a victim are limited.  Clearly, 
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further research with more realistic examples of victim- 
ization is necessary. 
Summary 
The present study failed to find persons high in 
belief in a just world more susceptible to depressed 
mood when asked to empathize with a victim in an uncontroll- 
able, or noncontingent, situation. 
The expected observer/empathy differences in derogation, 
that observersi would, derogate r.more than empathizers, was 
not supported, although an overall derogation effect was 
found.  There were no differences between high, medium 
and low just world individuals in derogation of the victim, 
failing to replicate previous research findings that high 
just world individuals derogated innocent victims more 
harshly than low just world individuals.  Important 
male-female differences reported in the evaluation of 
the victim clearly revealed a difference such that males 
rated the victim more positively overall, while females 
in all conditions derogated the victim,,  Thus, sex differ- 
ences should be an important consideration in just world 
and empathy research. 
Highly significant increases in anxious, hostile and 
depressed mood were found for all conditions after exposure 
to a victim who receives a series of obscene phone calls 
that she has little control over.  Yet, no differential 
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mood reactions were found between observers or empathizers 
or for different levels of belief in a just world.in response 
to the example of victimization. 
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REFERENCE NOTES 
Note 1. Sturm, C.A., Means, J.R., Fox, S.G. & Retzlaff, P.D. 
Male response to an innocent female victim as a 
function of belief in a just world and observer - 
versus empathy instructions.  Paper presented at 
the meetings of the Montana Psychological Associ- 
ation, Missoula, April, 1981. 
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APPENDIX A 
Transcript of Tape Manipulation 
Policeman: Okay, just step in here, please. Have a seat 
there I'll close the door. Now, the desk officer says you've 
been having some problems with a telephone caller, right? 
Woman: That's correct. 
Policeman: Speak up a little please. 
Woman: I probably should have reported this earlier, I don't 
really what to say about it. 
Policeman: Just tell me what's been going on. 
Woman: Okay. I've been getting calls for over two weeks now. 
Like I say, I would have done something at first, but I 
didn't know it would be like this. I didn't know he would 
keep calling. 
Policeman: Yeah, how did it start? 
Woman: I just got a call one night . It was really late and 
when I answered it nobody was on the other end. I just 
thought it was a wrong number. 
Policeman: Yeah, sometimes they start like that. 
Woman:- Well, a few nights later it happened again, that time 
I couldn't hear a voice but I could hear breathing on the 
other end.  Not really heavy breathing like you hear in the 
movies, but I knew there was somebody on the other end. 
I said "Hello"-', they wouldn't answer me.  I wasn't really 
frightened, I figured it was just kids so I hung up. 
Policeman: These guys like to get a reaction from you, how 
soon did he call again? 
Woman: He called back again that same night.  I just let it 
ring, I figured it was these damn kids.  But I was laying 
there and I got more and more angry so I decided to answer 
it and really tell them off.  But well, when I answered 
it, well, the caller, he was whispering something.  I 
couldn't understand what it was, but it frightened me.  I 
couldn't say anything at all, I just didn't know what to do. 
Policemant   Yeah, sometimes they just pick some girl's 
number out of a phone book, and sometimes they just dial 
at random till they get somebody0  But the thing that 
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really frightens a -woman is when he knows their name. 
Woman: Yeah, that is real scary, he does know my name.  I 
don't know if he knows me but he uses my name a lot. 
After that scary call I left my phone off the hook for a few 
nights. So he called me during the day.  He was really mad, 
he told me not to do it again, and kind of threatened me..... 
Policeman: Is there anybody you know, somebody you're 
acquainted with maybe that might do something like this. 
Uh, like, oh, an old boyfriend, someone you met recently, 
someone you do business with? 
Woman: He doesn't sound familiar, I don't think I know him. 
I do work part time as a waitress, I see a lot of people 
there, I don't know, it could be someone there, I don't 
know. 
Policeman: Has the man said anything else to you? 
Woman: Of course, a lot of sex stuff, pretty crude stuff, 
and he talks about me and him together, and he mixes it in' 
with all of this angry stuff, warns me not to tell anybody 
about it, not to report it.  I just don't know what to do— 
he knows when I leave the house, he knows when I come back, 
he says he knows where I go.  The other night I came home, 
and it was really late.  I walked in the door and the phone 
was ringing. Of course it was him, he started asking me all 
these questions, "Did I have a good time", "What did I do" 
"What did I like to do for entertainment"..  I wanted to 
hang up but I was really frightened.  I had been out with a 
man that night.  The caller started....he doesn't want me 
out with anyone else....like he's jealous or something. 
Policeman: This guy sounds kind of like the same pattern that 
happened a few months ago in that same area. But we didn't 
locate that guy because it depends alot on where he's calling 
frcm and how consistent his calls are. Now, you can help us 
if you can describe his voice, what did he sound like, was 
it muffled, or have an accent, or any background noise you 
could recognize, a bar, or maybe it was a phone booth on 
a street where you could hear cars.... or something... 
Woman: Just muffled. Like he's trying to disguise his voice. 
He talks* really slowly and uses a real low voice. 
This is getting really hard for me to handle,  yesterday 
he called again, my girlfriend was over and she answered the 
phone, so he started telling her all about it.  He knows 
when I go, when I come home, he started giving her messages 
to tell me that I should be staying good for him.  I don't 
know what this guy wants... 
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APPENDIX B 
Experimental Packet Cover Sheet 
The following psychological experiment involves listen- 
int to taped interview material.  You" will be asked to 
complete questions relevant to this material.  All responses 
will be held confidential. 
The benefits of this research will be discussed in a 
debriefing session after the experiment at which time any 
questions you may have will be answered fully. 
I consent to participate in the following experiment 
with the understanding that I am free to withdraw my 
consent and discontinue at any time. 
Signature 
Please complete the following information: 
Age  
Sex  M   F 
Year in college Fr   So  J   Sr  Grad 
Other  
Academic major  
Please complete the following pages of rating materials 
until you reach STOP.  The experimenter will give you further 
instructions. 




Belief in a Just World Scale 
Please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement 
with all of the folio-wing items by circling the appropriate 
number. 
Disagree Agree 
1. I've found that a person rarely 
deserves the reputation he has.       12   3   4   5   6 
2. Basically, the world is a just 
place. 12   3   4   5   6 
3. People who get "lucky breaks'.' have 
usually earned their good fortune.    1   2   3456 
4. Careful drivers are just as likely 
to get hurt in traffic accidents as 
careless ones. 12   3   4   5   6 
i 
5. It is a common occurrence for a 
guilty person to get off free in 
American courts. 1   2   3   4   5   6 
6. Students almost always deserve the 
grades they receive in school.        12   3   4   5   6 
7; Men who keep in shape have little 
chance of suffering a heart attack.   1   2   3   4   5   6 
8. The political candidate who sticks 
up for his principles rarely gets 
elected. 12   3   4   5   6 
9. It is rare for an innocent man to 
be wrongly sent to jail. 1   2   3  .4   5   6 
10.In professional sports, many fouls 
and infractions never get called by ' 
the referee. 12   3   4   5   6 
11.By and large, people deserve what 
they get. 12   3   4   5   6 
12.When parents punish their child- 
ren, it is almost always for good 
reasons. 12   3   4   5   6 
page 112 
APPENDIX C continued 
Disagree Agree 
13. Good deeds often go unnoticed     12   3   4   5   6 
and unrewarded. 
14. Although evil men may hold poli- 
tical power for a while, in the general 
course of history good wins out.       12   3   4   5   6 
15. In almost any business or pro- : 
fessions, people who do their job well' 
rise to the top. 12   3   4   5   6 
16. American parents tend to overlook 
the things to be most admired in their 
children. 12   3   4   5   6 
17. It is often impossible for a 
person to receive a fail trial in the 
USA. 12   3   4   5   6 
18. People who meet with misfortune 
have often brought it on themselves.   12   3   4   5   6 
19. Crime doesn't pay. 12   3   4   5   6 
20. Many people suffer through abso- 
lutely no fault of their own. 12   3   4   5   6 
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Desire for Control 
Below you will find a series of statements.  Please read 
each statement carefully and respond to it by expressing 
the extent to which you believe the statement applies to 
you.  For all items a response from 1 to 7 is required. 
Use the number that best reflects your belief when the 
scale is defined as follows: 
1- The 'statement doesn't apply to me at all. 
2- The statement usually doesn't apply to me. 
3- Most often, the statement does not apply. 
4- I am unsure about whether or not the statement 
applies to me, or it applies to me about half 
the time. 
5- The statement applies more often than not. 
6- The statement usually applies to me. 
7- The statement always applies to me. 
It is important that you respond to all items. 
 1. I prefer a job where i have a lot of control over 
what I do and when I do it. 
 2. I enjoy political participation because I want to 
have as much of a say in running a government as 
possible. 
 3. I try to aboid situations where someone else tells 
me what to do. 
 4. I would prefer to be a leader rather than a follower. 
 5. I enjoy being able to influence the actions of others. 
6. I am careful to check everything on an automobile 
before I leave for a long trip. 
_7. Others usually know what is best for me. 
8. I enjoy making my own decisions. 
_9. I enjoy having control over my own destiny. 
_10.I would rather someone else took over the leadership 
role when I'm involved in a group project. 
_11.I consider myself to be generally more capable of 
handling situations than others are. 
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_12. I'd rather run my own business and make my own 
mistakes than listen to someone else's orders. 
_13. I like to get a good idea of what a job is all 
about before I begin. 
14. When I see a problem I prefer to do something about 
it rather than sit by and let it continue. 
_15. When it comes to orders, I would rather give them 
than receive them. 
_16. I wish I could push many of life's daily decisions, 
off on someone else. 
17. When driving, I try to avoid putting myself in a 
situation where I could be hurt by someone else's 
mistake. 
18. I prefer to avoid situations where someone else 
has to tell me what it is I should be doing. 
_19.' There are many situations in which I would prefer 
only one choice rather than having to make a 
decision. 
20. I like to wait and see if someone else is going to 




Bipolar Adjective Rating - Pretest 
Please describe the average female college student along 
the following adjectives. Circle a number for each pair. 
1. intelligent unintelligent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
2. likable unlikable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
3. uncooperative cooperative".7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8.....9 
4. bossy easy going 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
5. immature mature 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
i i 
6. imaginative unimaginative 
1.....2 3 4 5 6 7. . . . .8 9 
7. irresponsible responsible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
8. nervous calm 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9. patient impatient 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8.....9 
10.reasonable                            unreasonable 
1 2.....3.....4 5 6 7 8„ . . . .9 
11.rigid                                      flexible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 .8 9 
12.courteous                                       rude 
1.....2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
13.selfish                                     unselfish 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
14.warm                                           cold 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
15.sincere                                     insincere 
1 .2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Bipolar Adjective Rating - Posttest 
Please describe the woman in the audiotape along the 
following adjectives.  Circle a number for each pair. 
1. intelligent unintelligent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
2. likable unlikable 
1 2. ....3 4 5 6 7. ... .8 9 
3. uncooperative cooperative 
1 2 3 4. ... .5 6 7. ... .8... .. .9 
4. bossy easy going 
1 2 3 4 5. 6 7 8 9 
5. immature mature 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
6. imaginative unimaginative 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
7. irresponsible responsible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
8. nervous calm 
1 2 3 4 5 6. ... .7 8 9 
9. patient impatient 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7. . . . .8 9 
10. reasonable unreasonable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
11. rigid ... flexible 
1 2 3 4 5 6. ... .7 8.....9 
12. courteous rude 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
13. selfish unselfish 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
14.. warm                                         cold 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
15. sincere                                   : insincere 
1 2 3. ... .4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Depression Adjective Check List - Form C 
DIRECTIONS:  Below you -will find words which describe different 
kinds of moods and feelings.  Check the words which describe 
How YOU Feel- Now. Some, of the words may sound alike, but we 
want you to check all the words that describe your feelings. 
Work rapidly and check all of the words which describe how 
you feel now at this time. 
1. Cheerless 17. Buoyant 





4. 20. Optimistic 
5. 21. Low 
6. Healthy 22. Deserted 
7. Discouraged 23. Burdened 
8. Bad 24. Wonderful 
9. Despondent 25. Crushed 








14. 30. Lucky 
15. Distressed 31. Chained 
16. Whole 32. Pessimistic 
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Depression Adjective Check List - Form D 
DIRECTIONS: Below you will find words which describe different 
kinds of moods and feelings.  Check the words which describe 
How You Feel Now - After Listening to the Audiotape. Some of 
the words may sound alike, but we want you to check all the 
words that describe your feelings. Work rapidly and check 
all of the words which describe how you feel now after list- 






2. 18. Lonesome 














































On the following sheet you will find words which describe 
different kinds of moods and feelings.  Mark an X in the 
boxes beside the words which describe how you feel now. 
Some of the words may sound alike, but we want you to 
check all the words that describe your feelings.  Work 
rapidly. 
Posttest 
On the following sheet you will find words which describe 
different kinds of moods and feelings. Mark an X in the 
boxes beside the words which describe how you feel now - 
after listening to the audiotape. Some of the words may 
sound alike, but we want you to check all the words that 
describe your feelings.  Work rapidly. 
APPENDIX   H 
Multiple Affect Adjective  Check List 
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1 □ active 
2 Q adventurous 
3 □ affectionate 
4 □ afraid 
5 □a^iUtr-d 
C □agreeable 
? O aggressive 
8 □alive 
9 fj alone 
10 □ amiable 
11 □ amused 
12 Q angry. 
13 □ annoyed 




18 □ bored 
19 Qcalm 
20 □ cautious 
21 □ cheerful 
22 □ clean 
23 □ complaining 
24 □ contented 
25 □ contrary 
26 □ cool 
27 □ cooperative 
28 □critical 
29 □ cross 
30 □ cruel 
31 □ daring 
32 □desperate 
33 □destroyed 
34 □ devoted 
35 □disagreeable 
3C □ discontented 
37 □discouraged 
38 □ disgusted 




43 □ fearful 
44 □fine 
45 Q fit 
46 O forlorn 
47 □ frank 
48 Dfrce 
49 □ friendly 
50 Q frightened 
51 Q furious 
52 Qgay 
53 Q gentle 
54 Qglad 
55 □ gloomy 
56 □ good 
57 □good-natured 
58 Qgrim 
59 □ happy 
60 □ healthy 
61 □ hopeless 
62 □ hostile 
63 □ impatient 
64 □ incensed 
65 □ indignant 
60 Q inspired 
67 □ interested 
6S □ irritated 
69 □ jealous 
70 □ joyful 
71 □ kindly 
72 □ lonely 
73 Olost 
74 □ loving 
75 □ low 
76 □ lucky 
77 Q mad 
78 □ mean 
70 □meek 
80 Q merry 
81 Dmild 
82 □ miserable 
83 Q nervous 
84 □ obliging 
85 □ offended 
86 □ outraged 
87 □ panicky ■ 
HS J~jpaiii-nl 
80 D peaceful 
90 □ pleased 
91 □ pleasant 
92 □ polite 
9:« □ powerful 
94 i_i quiet 
95 D reckless 
9G D rejected 
97 D rough 
98 □ sad 
99 D safe 
100 □ satisfied 
101 D secure 
102 □ shaky 
103 □ shy 
104 D soothed 
105 D steady 
106 D stubborn 
107 D stormy 
108 D strong 
109 D suffering 
110 D sullen 
111 □ sunk 
112 □ sympathetic 
113 □ tame 
114 □ tender 
115 D tense 
11G D terrible 
117 □ terrified 
118 D thoughtful 
111) □ timid 
120 □ tormented 
121 □ understanding 
122 □ unhappy 
123 □ unsociable 
124 □ upset 
12") □ vexed 
12!i □ warn) 
127 D whole 
12S □ wild 
129 D willful 
130 D wilted 
131 D worrying 




The following experiment deals with social observation 
and impression formation.  Basically, people are likely to 
be viewed differently by different persons.  These impressions 
may be important in interview situations such as job inter- 
views, business meetings or in everyday interpersonal 
contact. 
Psychological research has shown that people often 
form impressions of others based on subtle emotional cues. 
In a few minutes you will be listening to an actual example 
of an interview with a woman.  You will be asked to pay 
close attention to the emotional cues of the woman in 
this situation. 
STOP 
GO NO FURTHER UNTIL INSTRUCTED BY THE EXPERIMENTER 
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Observer Instructions 
The audiotape you will be listening to is a portion 
of an actual interview that took place recently in Missoula. 
As you listen, please attend carefully to everything the 
•woman is saying., In particular, take note of her emotional 
state and her reactions in this situation.  Be alert to 
any changes in her speech, tone of voice, or her general 
style of expression. 
While you are listening, do not try to imagine how 
you would feel in her place or how she may be feeling 




The audiotape you will be listening to is a portion 
of an actual interview that took place recently in Missoula. 
As you listen, please imagine how you would feel if you 
were in the same situation as this woman.  Your job will 
be to co-feel or empathize with her feelings and reactions. 
Try to imagine how it would feel to be in this person's 
shoes and how you would respond. 
Do not try to sympathize or feel sorry for the 
woman.  Just listen and keep clearly in mind that you are . 
to let yourself react as if you were having the experience. 
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Universal/Personal Attribution for Helplessness Scale 
Please respond to the following items as they relate to 
the situation you have just heard.  Indicate the degree 
of your agreement or disagreement with each of the items 
by circling the appropriate number. 
Disagree .Agree 
1. Women who receive such phone      12345   b   7 
calls are usually chosen randomly 
from the phone book0 
2. Given the circumstances presented, 12   3   4   5   6   7 
most people would have been able to 
handle receiving these kind of phone 
calls in a better way than this 
woman did. 
3. In this type of situation, it      1234567 
seems as if the threatening caller 
has most of the control. 
4. I would have had just as diffi-    12   3   4   5   6   7 
cult a time handling such a caller 
as the person on the audiotape had.   12   3   4   5   6   7 
5. I think this woman received more   12   3   4   5   6   7 
harassing phone calls than other 
women to whom this has happened in 
the past. 
6. Something about this person may   12   3   4   5   6   7 
have had to do with why she was 
receiving threatening phone calls. 
7. Women who receive these kinds of   1   2   3   4   5   6   7 
bothersome phone calls can't really 
do much about them. 
8. This woman reacted more emotion-   12   3   4   5   6   7 
ally to the situation than most 
people would have. 
9. Everyone receives an obscene      12   3   4   5   6   7 
phone call sooner or later. 
10. I feel that this woman could     12   3   4   5   6   7 




Strength of expectation of future noncontinqency 
1. How many more harassing phone calls do you thing this 
woman will continue to receive after having reported 
her problem?  Circle the appropriate number, 
none 1 2 3 4 5 6 or more 
Likelihood of harm 
2. How likely do you think it is that the caller will do 
physical harm to the woman? 
not likely                          likely 
1 2 — 3 4 5 6 7 
Observer/empathy involvement 
3. Please rate your participation on the following item: 
I listened to how I put myself 
this woman reacted in this woman's 
in this situation place during the 
during the audiotape. audiotape. 
1 __ 2 — 3—4—5 — 6—7 — 8 — 9 
General objective/subjective bias 
4. If I were to read an article in the newspaper about 
someone in a similar situation as this woman I would 
generally: (check only one) 
 be more concerned with the facts 
or : 
consider the woman's point of view 
Credibility 
5. I feel this was a believable example of women who receive 
a series of threatening phone calls. 
No                                                     Yes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Previous Exposure to Obscene Phone Calls 
Have you ever received any obscene phone calls? Yes i' No 
If so, did they continue over a period of time? 
How long did they continue, and how many phone calls 
■were there? 
Have you had any close relatives or friends who have 
received a series of such phone calls? Yes    No 
If so, how long did they persist? 
